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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that share one common
feature: all three of them relate to the literature on Bargaining. The first
and second essay are joint work with my supervisor, Professor Andrés
Carvajal.
In our first essay we investigate the testable implications of the Nash
bargaining solution. We develop polynomial tests of the NBS under
different hypothesis about the default levels. For instance, with, and
without observation from the outside econometrician of the levels of
utility that the individuals would have obtained outside the negotiation.
We use the Tarski-Seindenberg algorithm to characterize rationalizable
data as those that satisfy a finite system of polynomial inequalities.
In our second essay we introduce a new equilibrium concept for games of
political competition. We model electoral competition within each party,
assuming inner-party members have somewhat conflicting preferences.
By using the bargaining protocol à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) we
explicitly model party members’ strategic interactions, their incentives
and their decision of whom to elect. Our equilibrium concept attempts to
model each member’s decision as if each player were uncertain about, (i)
the faction that will eventually dominate the decision made by the other
party and (ii) the faction that will dominate in the party’s nomination.
In the last essay I focus on one of the classical problems in bargaining:
6
the divide the dollar problem. In our framework we assume players’
utility functions mirror selfish and Rawlsian preferences. We derive the
set of subgame perfect equilibria for different arrangements of player
types and study why strategic generosity emerges under the bargaining
protocol we assume.
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Chapter 1
Essay one
On Refutability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution.
A. Carvajal and N. González
Department of Economics, University of Warwick
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.. I
Among the most prominent solution concepts to bargaining problems is the one
proposed by Nash in 1953. This solution has been used to describe a variety of de-
cision processes—for instance, to model the firm’s decision process as a bargaining
game between a itself and its union, the share of profits in a cartel or job-search
models. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the testable restrictions that the
NBS has on the allocations of an aggregate resource (i.e, sharing of a pie) from
a revealed preference analysis. We develop polynomial tests for the NBS, under
different hypotheses about the behaviour of disagreement levels, and use the Tarski-
Seindenberg algorithm to characterize rationalizable data as those that satisfy a
finite system of polynomial inequalities.
Related Literature: The studies that have investigated the empirical content of
the NBS can be divided in two main streams: the differential approach and the
revealed preference analysis. In the former, Manser and Brown (1980) studied the
empirical content of household decision making, (i.e, how to allocate resources and
gains). They step away from Becker’s (1973, 1974) bargaining rule that the house-
hold maximizes one individual’s utility function and explicitly allow for different
utility functions within a household inhabited by two individuals. They define gains
in a marriage to exist if the maximum utility that each individual can attain lies
inside the utility possibility frontier. If this occurs, the household must decide on a
distribution of resources and distribution of gains. They invoke two bargaining so-
9
lution concepts, NBS and Kalai and Smorodinsky’s (1975) solution concept, and also
consider, what they call the Pareto optimal solution, which is the dictatorial case.
In all cases they assume that the two individuals have von Neuman-Morgenstern
utility functions and maximize subject to the corresponding constraints, which in
turn yield the demand functions. The comparative static properties of the demand
functions are compared with maximizing a single utility function, using the Slutsky
conditions. A drawback of their work is the presence of a bargaining rule like
the one allowed by Becker (1974) in order to guarantee the resolution of conflict.
Along the same vein, McElroy and Horney (1981 and 1990), derive a Nash gen-
eralization of the Slutsky conditions for household demand function and explain
behavior consistent with Nash behavior and the so-called neoclassical individual
utility maximizer.1
For some time, the literature on collective household decision processes borrowed
solution concepts, such as NBS, Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash-Zeuthen2, however,
Chiappori (1988) suggested that "these conditions are not restricitve, unless the
agents’ premaritial preferences are known." Instead, Chiappori (1992) derived, from a
collective setting, a set of testable restrictions on observable behaviour, using labour
supply, under the form of partial differential equations. Contrary to the Slutsky
1 For studies that refer to the differential approach, but use different solution concepts, see,
Lunderberg and Pollack (1993), Chen and Woolley (2001). In non-strategic settings, the differential
approach has allowed economists to argue that non-observed fundamentals can be unambiguously
recovered from observed equilibrium outcomes; for a survey of this literature, and also of early
literature on the revealed preference approach, see Carvajal et al (2004).
2 See, Svejnar (1980).
10
equations obtained from the traditional models, he suggested an alternative way
of deriving structural conditions (i.e, conditions on parameters) on the functional
forms for demand or labour supply functions. Chiappori and Doni (2006) extends
this analysis to the case of the NBS.
The second strand of literature follows the discussion of Samuelson (1938),
Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) which focuses on revealed preference theory of in-
dividual behaviour to characterize rationalizabilty using a finite set of consumption
data, that is, prices and quantities. Only until recently has the literature obtained
testable implications on data for game theoretical solution concepts. For example,
Sprumont (2000) considers a non-cooperative game played by a finite number of
players, each of whom can choose a strategy from a finite set, and identifies general
necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash-rationalizability. Ray and Zhou (2001)
focus on extensive form games and derive a set of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for sub-game Nash rationalizability. Other related literature includes Carvajal
(2010), who studies whether Nash-Walras equilibrium imposes testable restrictions
on the equilibrium prices of economies with externalities, and Carvajal et al (2012),
who develop the revealed preference analysis of the Cournot model of oligopolistic
competition.
Following the revealed preference approach, we do not impose any specific func-
tional form, thus we do not test consistency of observed behaviour conditional on
a specific functional form. For instance, our results do not rely on empirical work
that uses parametric specifications or preferences, or other restrictive assumptions
of the parameters of the model. In this respect, Chambers and Echenique (2011) is
11
closely related in the sense that the they too focus on the allocation of a single-
dimensional resource. The analyst has available data on how money is divided
amongst a fixed number of agents, but has no information on the individuals’ pref-
erences and the protocol that leads to the division. They select three theories that
could possibly explain the division of money, those of the utilitarian, Nash and
egalitarian max-min models (assuming the observed disagreement utility levels are
fixed) and show that all three models are observationally equivalent. A main dif-
ference is that we characterize rationalizable data as those that satisfy a system of
quadratic inequalities and apply the Tarski-Seindenberg algorithm to obtain a test
for the NBS (under various hypotheses about the behaviour of the default utility
levels), unlike them who use a dual characterization of the problem that satisfies a
system of polynomial inequalities. Under the hypothesis that default utility levels
vary they apply the Positivstellensatz to construct tests for Nash bargaining and
the utilitarian model. Also, Chambers and Echenique only consider a subset of the
scenarios that we study here.
Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011) also investigate the empirical content
of the NBS, but they focus on a different setting than ours: they consider a model
where a pair of agents bargain over a consumption bundle and allow agents to have
the option of making consumption purchases on their own, therefore they assume
disagreement points vary endogenously, whereas we bargain over the share of a pie
(e.g. divide the dollar) and default utility levels are exogenously determined. They
provide necessary and sufficient conditions to solve the system of inequalities that
must be satisfied should data be rationalizable. Finally, they design and conduct
12
an experiment allowing them to obtain data on (i) individuals default utility levels
of consumption bundles and (ii) bargaining outcomes so that they could verify the
consistency of the pair of consumptions bundles with the Nash bargaining solution.
Outline of the paper: In section 2, we define the NBS under the assumption
that the outside econometrician can observe both, the allocation of an aggregate
endowment, and the utility levels individuals can obtain provided they do not reach
an agreement, and derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for a data set to be
rationalizable. Then, in section 3, we drop the strong assumption of default utilities
levels being observable, and find that the hypothesis has no scientific meaning, from
a Popperian viewpoint. We restore falsifiability when we impose some conditions
on the unobservable default utility levels. After showing that the solution concept
can be corroborated, or refuted, by imposing conditions on the unobserved default
levels, in section 4 and 5 we assume, instead, the econometrician has information
about the behaviour of income levels, individuals can attain outside the cooperative
agreement, and test if a data set is rationalizable. Due to the constricted nature
of our tests (i.e. the data either satisfies the optimisation hypothesis, or it does
not) if a test isn’t rationalizable, how do we know it isn’t the case that by applying
a small perturbation to the data, the test of rationalizability may pass? "If some
data fail the tests, but only by a small amount, we might be tempted to attribute
this failure to measurement error, left out variables, or other sorts of stochastic
influences rather than to reject the hypothesis outright" Varian (1985). Therefore,
in section 6, and in the tradition of Varian (1985) we measure the magnitude of
13
departure from the optimisation hypothesis, i.e. we construct a statistical version
of the test of rationalizability. In section 7 we generalize the setting of section 2
for an arbitrary number of players and asymmetric bargaining powers. Finally, in
section 8 we conclude.
.. N  
Suppose that we observe, for a finite number of situations, the way in which two
people split a common endowment: for each t in the set {1, . . . , T }, we observe the
allocation (x1t, x2t) ∈ R2, of an aggregate resource Xt ∈ R. When can we guarantee
that this information can be modelled by the Nash bargaining solution, given that
we cannot observe the individuals’ utility functions?
Let us denote by ui(x) the utility level that individual i attains if she consumes
x units of the resource. If the collective decision of the two people is consistent
with the Nash solution, each observation must solve the program
max
x1,x2
{
[u1(x1) − v1t][u
2(x2) − v2t ] : x
1 + x2 = Xt and ui(xi) > vit
}
, (1.1)
where v1t and v2t are exogenously determined utility levels that the players can obtain
by themselves if they break up the negotiations. Note that we assume, as in the
original work of Nash, that there is a feasible allocation that leaves both individuals
strictly better off than if they do withdraw from the negotiations. Now, suppose that
all an outside econometrician can observe is the data
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
, (1.2)
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but he does not know the utility functions u1 and u2. What restrictions does the
structure of Program (1.1) impose on data set (1.2)?3
1.2.1. Under Observation of Default Utility Levels
Suppose, for the moment, that the analyst also has information about the utility
levels that both individuals would attain if they did not agree on how to share the
resource.4 In this case, the data set would be of the form
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt, v1t, v2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
, (1.3)
where we assume that x1t + x2t = Xt at all observations.5
We say that data set (1.3) is rationalizable if there exist utility functions u1 : R→
R and u2 : R → R, both of which are strictly increasing and strictly concave, such
that at each observation t, the pair (x1t, x2t) solves Program (1.1).6
3 It is important to note that we test the hypothesis that the observed outcome is derived from the
Nash bargaining solution under a restricted domain of problems: those corresponding to a given pair
of individuals, for a finite set of aggregate resources and default payoffs. This is in contrast to the
axiomatic analysis of the solution, where the entire universe of bargaining problems is considered.
In this sense, our results do not offer an axiomatization of the solution, but just the set of all the
necessary conditions that the data have to satisfy if they are derived from the solution in the finite
set of observations of the individuals.
4 Surely, later we will relax the assumption that these status quo utility levels are observable.
5 We comment, below, why we do not allow for waste of the aggregate resource.
6 Since we impose strict monotonicity of preferences, it is an immediate testable implication of
the rationalizability definition that the individuals do not want to waste resources. Of course, there
are other solution concepts in which the latter is not true, and the assumption that x1t + x2t = Xt
15
1.2.2. A test of rationalizability: necessary conditions
P 1. If a data set of form (1.3) is rationalizable, then there exists an array
of numbers {
(µ1t,µ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the following system: for all t and t ′,
µit ′ 6 µit + λt(µit − vit)(xit ′ − xit), (1.4)
with strict inequality if xit 6= xit ′ ; for all i and all t,
µit > v
i
t; (1.5)
and for all t,
λt > 0. (1.6)
Proof: Under strict monotonicity, we can re-write Program (1.1) as
min
x
{
ft(x) : u
1(x) > v1t and u2(Xt − x) > v2t
}
, (1.7)
where
ft(x) := [v
1
t − u
1(x)][u2(X− x) − v2t ].
Since both utility functions are concave, they are Lipschitz continuous and,
hence, a necessary condition for x1t to solve Program (1.7) is that 0 ∈ ∂ft(x1t).7 By
construction, 0 ∈ ∂ft(x1t) only if there exist δ1t ∈ ∂u1(x1t) and δ2t ∈ ∂u2(x2t) such that
δ1t[u
2(Xt − x
1
t) − v
2
t ] = δ
2
t [u
1(x1t) − v
1
t].
would be restrictive if we were studying those solutions. For the focus of our paper, the question is
what restrictions, other than the fact that there is no waste, are implied by the solution hypothesis.
7 We use ∂g to denote the subgradient of any function g.
16
Since function u1 is strictly increasing, if we define the number
λt :=
δ1t
u1(x1t) − v
1
t
> 0,
we get that, for both individuals, necessarily, δit = λt[ui(xit) − vit]. Since both u1 and
u2 are strictly concave and δit ∈ ∂ui(xit), the latter implies that, for all x ∈ R, x 6= xit,
ui(x) < ui(xit) + λt[u
i(xit) − v
i
t](x− x
i
t).
Thus, we can define the numbers µit := ui(xit) > vit. Q.E.D.
A comment on the implications of this proposition is in order.8 It is well
known that the Nash bargaining solution treats the preferences of the individuals
as cardinal objects. It may then seem paradoxical that our revealed preferences
approach is applicable in this context, since this approach is normally of ordinal
nature. But it is then important to note that the necessary condition (1.4) imposes
a common factor to the term that appears on the right-hand side of the usual
Afriat expansion: λt is common to both individuals. This commonality gives the
whole system cardinal content: the λt that solves Eq. (1.4) is not robust to arbitrary
transformations of the preferences of the individuals, even if they preserve their
ordinal content.
While this result provides a necessary condition for rationalizability, by itself it
does not constitute a test of the hypothesis, for in principle it could be that the nec-
essary condition is tautological, in which case any data set would be rationalizable
and the hypothesis would not be refutable.
8 We thank Alejandro Saporiti for this observation.
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1.2.3. Power of the test: sufficiency and non-tautology of the necessary condition
Our next claim is that the existence of a solution to the system of inequalities
defined by Eqs. (1.4) to (1.6) exhausts the necessary conditions of the hypothesis
that a data set is rationalizable, as this condition is also sufficient for the hypothesis.
P 2. Given a data set of form (1.3), suppose that there exists an array of
numbers {
(µ1t,µ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the system of inequalities (1.4) to (1.6), defined in Proposition 1. Then, the
data set is rationalizable, and the utility functions that rationalize it can be constructed
in the class C2.
Proof: Given a solution
{
(µ1t,µ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
to the system of inequalities,
construct the following utility functions: for each player i,
ui0(x) := min
{
µit + λt(µ
i
t − v
i
t)(x− x
i
t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
,
mapping R into R. These functions are continuous, concave and strictly increasing,
and are C∞ at all but a finite number of points in R.
With these constructions, and for any observation t, note that ui0(xit) 6 µit. If
this inequality was strict, then for some other observation t ′ we would have that
µit ′ + λt ′(µ
i
t ′ − v
i
t ′)(x
i
t − x
i
t ′) < µ
i
t,
which contradicts Eq. (1.4),9 so we must conclude that ui0(xit) = µit.
9 By Eqs. (1.4) the linear approximation must be the tangent line to the general function, i.e.
ui0(x
i
t) = u
i(xit).
18
Now, consider any pair (x1, x2) 6= (x1t, x2t) that is feasible in the program
max
x1,x2
{
[u10(x
1) − v1t][u
2
0(x
2) − v2t ] : x
1 + x2 6 Xt and ui0(xi) > vit
}
. (1.8)
By definition and construction,
0 < ui0(xi) − vit 6 µit + λt(µit − vit)(xi − xit) − vit
for both i = 1, 2. Multiplying, we thus get that
[u10(x
1) − v1t][u
2
0(x
2) − v2t ] 6 [µ1t + λt(µ1t − v1t)(x1 − x1t) − v1t][µ2t + λt(µ2t − v2t )(x2 − x2t ) − v2t ]
= (µ1t − v
1
t)(µ
2
t − v
2
t )[1+ λt(x1 − x1t)][1+ λt(x2 − x2t )]
= (µ1t − v
1
t)(µ
2
t − v
2
t )[1+ λt(x1 + x2 − Xt) + (λt)2(x1 − x1t)(x2 − x2t )],
where, in the last line, we have used the fact that x1t + x2t = Xt. Now, consider each
of the terms on the right-hand side of the latter expression: first, by feasibility of
(x1, x2), we have that
µ1t − v
1
t > 0 and µ2t − v2t > 0;
also, by Eq. (1.6) and feasibility, we have that
λt(x
1 + x2 − Xt) 6 0;
and, finally, we have that
(x1 − x1t)(x
2 − x2t) 6 0,
since again, by feasibility, x1+x2 6 Xt = x1t+x2t . Since (x1, x2) 6= (x1t, x2t), the previous
two inequalities cannot hold with equality at the same time. This implies that
1+ λt(x1 + x2 − Xt) + (λt)2(x1 − x1t)(x2 − x2t) < 1,
19
and hence that
(µ1t − v
1
t)(µ
2
t − v
2
t)[1+ λt(x1 + x2 − Xt) + (λt)2(x1 − x1t)(x2 − x2t)] < (µ1t − v1t)(µ2t − v2t).
We conclude, hence, that
[u10(x
1) − v1t][u
2
0(x
2) − v2t ] < (µ
1
t − v
1
t)(µ
2
t − v
2
t) = [u
1
0(x
1
t) − v
1
t][u
2
0(x
2
t) − v
2
t ], (1.9)
and since, by Eq. (1.5), ui0(xit) > vit for both i = 1, 2, and x1t + x2t = Xt, we conclude
that (x1t, x2t) solves Program (1.8).
To complete the proof, we ought to show that u10 and u20 can be deformed into
functions u1 and u2 that are strictly concave and smooth. This can be done, using
a convolution, since the inequalities of Eq. (1.4) and Eq. (1.9) are all strict when-
ever xit 6= xit ′ , and since the number of observations is finite. The details of this
construction are deferred to Appendix A. Q.E.D.
An implication of the proposition is that, as is commonly the case in the revealed
preference literature, an analyst would need at least two observations in order to
be able to reject the hypothesis of the Nash bargaining solution: if T = 1, then
condition 1.4 is vacuous and the whole system is always satisfied.10
10 An explicit construction that rationalizes any single observation (x1, x2,X, v1, v2) is as follows:
assume, with no loss of generality, that x2 > x1 > 0, and let u1(x) = ln x + α and u2(x) = ln x + β,
with β > v2 +max{0,− ln x2} and
α = v1 − ln x1 +
x2
x1
(ln x2 + β− v2).
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More importantly, together with Proposition 1, this latter result allows us to
claim that the hypothesis of rationalizability is testable, and to state the type of test
an analyst can develop.
P 3. There exists a non-tautological condition that a data set of form (1.3)
satisfies if, and only if, it is rationalizable. Moreover, this condition is a finite set of
polynomial inequalities on
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt, v1t, v2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
.
Proof: The set of values of
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt, v1t, v2t ,µ1t,µ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that satisfy the system of inequalities defined by Eqs. (1.4) to (1.6) is, by definition,
a semi-algebraic set. By the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm, the projection of this
set into the space of data (that is, of values of
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt, v1t, v2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
) is
semi-algebraic as well, which means that it can be characterized by a finite set of
polynomial inequalities. Then, by Propositions 1 and 2, a data set is rationalizable
if, and only if, it satisfies these polynomial inequalities (or, put another way, if it
lies in the latter projected set).
To see that such system of polynomial inequalities is not tautological, it suffices
to find a non-rationalizable data set. To see this, consider a set of the form (1.3)
where, for a pair of observations t and t ′ one has that v1t = v1t ′ , v2t = v2t ′ , Xt < Xt ′
and x1t > x1t ′ . If such set were rationalizable, there would exist δit ∈ ∂ui(xit) and
δit ′ ∈ ∂ui(xit ′), for i = 1, 2, such that
δ1t[u
2(x2t) − v
2
t ] = δ
2
t [u
1(x1t) − v
1
t] (1.10)
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and
δ1t ′[u
2(x2t ′) − v
2
t ′] = δ
2
t ′[u
1(x1t ′) − v
1
t ′]. (1.11)
By concavity of the utility functions, δ1t < δ1t ′ and δ2t > δ2t ′ , given that x2t < x2t ′ since
Xt < Xt ′ . By their monotoniciy, similarly, u1(x1t) > u1(x1t ′) and u2(x2t) < u2(x2t ′). It
then follows that
δ1t[u
2(x2t) − v
2
t ] < δ
1
t ′[u
2(x2t ′) − v
2
t ]
= δ1t ′[u
2(x2t ′) − v
2
t ′]
= δ2t ′[u
1(x1t ′) − v
1
t ′]
= δ2t ′[u
1(x1t ′) − v
1
t]
< δ2t [u
1(x1t) − v
1
t]
= δ1t[u
2(x2t) − v
2
t ],
where the second equality follows from Eq. (1.11), and the last one from (1.10). This
is obviously impossible, so we conclude that the data set cannot be rationalized.
Q.E.D.
In fact, it is useful to complement the proof of this proposition with an analysis
of the comparative statics of Program (1.1), for the case when the utility functions
are differentiable twice. In such case, note that we can write the first-order condition
of program
max
x1,x2
{
[u1(x1) − v1][u2(X− x1) − v2] : u1(x1) > v1 and u2(X− x1) > v2
}
,
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as
∂u1(x1)[u2(X− x1) − v2] = ∂u2(X− x1)[u1(x1) − v1].
If we totally differentiate this equation, we get that, over the manifold of solutions
to the program, dx1 equals{
∂2u2(x2)[u1(x1) − v1] − ∂u1(x1)∂u2(x2)
}
dX− ∂u2(x2)dv1 + ∂u1(x1)dv2
∂2u1(x1)[u2(x2) − v2] − 2∂u1(x1)∂u2(x2) + ∂2u2(x2)[u1(x1) − v1]
. (1.12)
Since both utility functions are strictly increasing and strictly concave, and since
u1(x1) > v1 and u2(X − x1) > v2, it follows that the denominator in this equation
is negative. For the same reasons, the term that multiplies dX in the numerator
is negative too, while the terms that multiply dv1 and dv2 are both positive. As a
consequence, it follows that if dX > 0, dv1 > 0 and dv2 < 0, then, unambiguously,
dx1 > 0. It then follows that a data set of form (1.3) is not rationalizable if it
contains a pair of distinct observations, t and t ′, such that
Xt > Xt ′ , v1t > v1t ′ , v2t < v2t ′ and x1t < x1t ′ .
Subsequently, this observation will allow us to claim that, under differentiable utility
functions, the hypothesis of rationalizability is refutable on the basis of a test.
.. W O  D U L
Suppose now that the observer has no information about the default utility levels
of the two individuals, so that the data set reduces to (1.2).11
11 We maintain the assumption that x1t + x2t = Xt at all observations.
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1.3.1. No assumptions on the default utility levels: unfalsifiability
Suppose that the analyst is not willing to impose any conditions on the (unobserved)
utility levels that the individuals could have obtained by withdrawing from the ne-
gotiation. In this setting, we shall say that the data set of form (1.2) is rationalizable
if there exist default utility levels v1t and v2t , for t = 1, . . . , T , and individual utility
functions u1 : R → R and u2 : R → R, both of which are strictly increasing and
strictly concave, and are such that at each observation t, the pair (x1t, x2t) solves
Program (1.1).
Our next result shows that in this case the hypothesis of rationalizability becomes
irrefutable.
P 4. Any data set of the form (1.2) is rationalizable. Moreover, in the
rationalization both utility functions can be constructed in the class C2.
Before proving the proposition, we introduce a lemma that will be useful for the
result.
L 1. For any finite set of numbers {xs : s = 1, . . . ,S}, there exists an array of
pairs of numbers, {(µs, δs) : s = 1, . . . ,S}, such that δs > 0 for all s, and
µs ′ < µs + δs(xs ′ − xs)
for all s and all s ′ 6= s.
Proof: With no loss of generality, let us assume that x1 > x2 > . . . > xS. We can
re-write the desired conditions as
µs ′ − µs + δs(xs − xs ′) < 0,
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for all s and all s ′ 6= s, with −δs < 0 for all s.
If such system has no solution, then, by the Theorem of the Alternative,12 we
can find a double array of non-negative numbers {αs,s ′ : s, s ′ = 1, . . . ,S, s ′ 6= s} and
an array of non-negative numbers {βs : s = 1, . . . ,S} such that, for all s,
∑
s ′ 6=s
αs,s ′ =
∑
s ′ 6=s
αs ′,s (1.13)
and ∑
s ′ 6=s
αs,s ′(xs − xs ′) = βs, (1.14)
with at least one of the numbers in these two arrays being different from zero.
Aggregating Eq. (1.14) across observations,
∑
s
∑
s ′ 6=s αs,s ′(xs − xs ′) =
∑
s βs. By
Eq. (1.13), the left-hand side of the latter expression is null, which in turn implies
that βs = 0 for all s. Using this, Eq. (1.14) implies that
∑
s ′ 6=1 α1,s ′(x1 − xs ′) = 0. But
note that, since x1 > xs for all s 6= 1, this equality is possible only if α1,s ′ = 0 for
all s ′ 6= 1. Then, (1.13) implies that, moreover, αs ′,1 = 0 for all s ′ 6= 1. But then, for
s = 2, (1.14) implies that
∑
s>3
α2,s ′(x2 − xs ′) =
∑
s ′ 6=2
α2,s ′(x2 − xs ′) = 0.
Again, since x2 > xs for all s > 3, the latter implies that α2,s ′ = 0 for all s ′ 6= 2,
and (1.13) again implies that αs ′,2 = 0 for all s ′ 6= 2. Continuing in this fashion, we
obtain that αs,s ′ = 0 for all s and all s ′ 6= s, which contradicts the fact that at least
one of the numbers in the two arrays is different from zero. Q.E.D.
12 See, for example, R. Tyrell Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970.
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This lemma is the key step in the proof of Proposition 4:
Proof of Proposition 4: Given the data set, by Lemma 1 we have that for each
individual i = 1, 2, we can find numbers µit and δit > 0 for all t, such that
µit ′ 6 µit + δit(xit ′ − xit),
with strict inequality if xit ′ 6= xit.
Now, fix an arbitrary array of numbers
{
v1t : t = 1, . . . , T
}
such that v1t < µ1t at all
t. Using these numbers, define, for each t,
λt :=
δ1t
µ1t − v
1
t
and
v2t := µ
2
t −
δ2t
λt
.
By construction, λt > 0 and v2t < µ2t , while it is immediate that
µit + λt(µ
i
t − v
i
t)(x
i
t ′ − x
i
t) = µ
i
t + δ
i
t(x
i
t ′ − x
i
t) > µit ′ .
with strict inequality if xit ′−xit. By Proposition 2, it follows that there are individual
utility functions u1 and u2 that satisfy the desired properties and are such that at
each observation t, the pair (x1t, x2t) solves Program (1.1). Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 tells the analyst that if he is not willing to make any assumptions
on the levels of utility that the two individuals could secure for themselves by
breaking up the negotiations, or on the evolution of these levels, the hypothesis that
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the data can be explained using the Nash bargaining solution is not refutable and,
hence, the hypothesis itself is unscientific from a Popperian perspective. In fact,
a careful look at the proof of that proposition shows that even if the analyst had
observations of the default utility levels of one of the individuals, but not on the
levels of the other one, then the hypothesis of Nash bargaining solution would be
unfalsifiable: this is, indeed, what the proof actually shows. Moreover, with a small
modification of the proof one can show that the player for whom the analyst has
observed the default utility levels need not be the same at all observations: if, for
each observation, one observes vit but not v¬it , the argument continues to hold by
defining
λt :=
δit
µit − v
i
t
> 0
and
v¬it := µ
¬i
t −
δ¬it
λt
< µ¬it ;
even in this case, the hypothesis continues to be irrefutable.
1.3.2. Some assumptions on the default utility levels: falsifiability restored
We now know that, in order to have a testable theory, the analyst has to impose
conditions on the evolution of default utility levels. These conditions will now form
part of the hypothesis being tested,13 and rejection of this joint test does not inform
which of the hypotheses drove the rejection. Still, if in a given exercise the analyst
13 As much as, for instance, the conditions that define the class of utility functions that are being
allowed by our definitions.
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can reasonably impose structure on these unobserved variables, if this structure is
‘enough’ it may restore the refutability of the hypothesis.
For instance, say that a data set of the form (1.2) is rationalizable with invariant
default utility levels if there exist two numbers v1 and v2, and individual utility
functions u1 : R → R and u2 : R → R, both of which are strictly increasing and
strictly concave, such that at each observation t, the pair (x1t, x2t) solves program
max
x1,x2
{
[u1(x1) − v1][u2(x2) − v2] : x1 + x2 6 Xt and ui(xi) > vi
}
.
Our next result is that this extra assumption on the unobserved utility levels
strengthens the hypothesis and renders it refutable again.
P 5. There exists a non-tautological condition that a data set of form
(1.2) satisfies if, and only if, it is rationalizable with invariant default utility levels.
Moreover, this condition is a finite set of polynomial inequalities on
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
.
Proof: Since the details of the argument are similar to previous ones, we shall omit
them. First, as in the proof of Proposition 1 if the data set is rationalizable with
invariant default utility levels, there must exist a pair of numbers (v1, v2) and an
array of numbers {
(µ1t,µ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the following system:
µit ′ 6 µit + λt(µit − vi)(xit ′ − xit), (1.15)
28
with strict inequality if xit ′ 6= xit,
µit > v
i, (1.16)
and
λt > 0. (1.17)
On the other hand, it follows from Proposition 2 that the existence of this
solution to the system is sufficient for the data set to be rationalizable, and since
the pair (v1, v2) remains constant across all observations, the data set is, a fortiori,
rationalized with invariant default utility levels.
Now, as in the proof of Proposition 3, the system of inequalities (1.15), (1.16) and
(1.17) defines a semi-algebraic set, so its projection into the space of data is semi-
algebraic as well, and is characterized by a finite set of polynomial inequalities. In
order to see that such condition is non-tautological, it suffices to observe that, as
in Proposition 3, any data set in which xit and Xt are not co-monotone cannot be
rationalized with invariant default utilities.14 Q.E.D.
Invariance of the unobserved utility levels is not the only case in which the ana-
lyst can recover refutability: our argument can be extended to argue that the hypoth-
esis is refutable if it imposes that the unobserved utility levels
{
(v1t, v2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
,
while not being observed, satisfy that, v1t is weakly co-monotone with Xt and v2t is
weakly anti-co-monotone with Xt. Indeed, in this case the necessary and sufficient
14 Variables yt and zt are said to be co-monotone if yt > yt′ occurs when, and only when,
zt > zt′ . They are anti-co-monotone if yt > yt′ occurs when, and only when, zt 6 zt′ .
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system of inequalities is defined on the array
{
(µ1t,µ2t , v1t, v2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
,
and it includes Eqs. (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), as well as the following two requirements,
which are immediate from the new assumptions: for every t and every t ′
(v1t − v
1
t ′)(Xt − Xt ′) > 0,
while
(v2t − v
2
t ′)(Xt − Xt ′) 6 0.
Since these extra inequalities are polynomial, the set of solutions remains semi-
algebraic and our analysis of its projection is still valid. On the other hand, it fol-
lows immediately from Eq. (1.12) that in this case x1t and Xt must be co-monotonic,
so the system that characterizes the projection is again non-tautological.15
.. D I L
The model under consideration, and the way in which we have dealt with it so far,
specifies utility levels that the individuals can attain by withdrawing from the nego-
tiation without reaching an agreement. We have seen that even if utility levels are
observed, or at least are restricted by the econometrician when they are unobserved,
makes a significant difference in terms of the empirical implications of the model.
However, it is more realistic to assume that the analyst has some information, or
hypothesis, about the behavior of the income levels that the individuals can obtain
15 Now, though, we cannot say anything about the co-variation of x2t and Xt.
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outside the cooperative agreement as opposed to the utility they derive from these
income levels. So, suppose now that the data set is of the form
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt,y1t,y2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
, (1.18)
where yit represents the default income level that individual i could have obtained
at observation t if an agreement had not been reached. We continue to assume
that x1t + x2t = Xt, and additionally, suppose that xit > yit at all observations.
We will say that a data set of the form (1.18) is rationalizable if there exist utility
functions u1 : R → R and u2 : R → R, both of which are strictly increasing and
strictly concave, such that at each observation t, the pair (x1t, x2t) solves the program
max
x1,x2
{
[u1(x1) − u1(y1t)][u
2(x2) − u2(y2t )] : x
1 + x2 6 Xt and ui(xi) > ui(yit)
}
. (1.19)
The next result, which is analogous to Proposition 1, says that a necessary con-
dition for rationalizability is the existence of a solution to a system of polynomial
inequalities. The system required for this new setting, however, is slightly more
complicated as we now need to account for more points in the domain of the utility
functions.
P 6. If a data set of the form (1.18) is rationalizable, then there exists an
array of numbers {
(µ1t,µ2t , v1t, v2t , δ1t, δ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the following system:
µit ′ 6 µit + λt(µit − vit)(xit ′ − xit), (1.20)
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with strict inequality if xit ′ 6= xit;
vit ′ 6 vit + δit(yit ′ − yit), (1.21)
with strict inequality if yit ′ 6= yit;
µit ′ 6 vit + δit(xit ′ − yit), (1.22)
with strict inequality if xit ′ 6= yit;
vit ′ 6 µit + λt(µit − vit)(yit ′ − xit) (1.23)
with strict inequality if yit ′ 6= xit;
µit > v
i
t (1.24)
and
δit > 0 (1.25)
for all i, all t and all t ′ 6= t; and
λt > 0 (1.26)
for all t.
Proof: As in the proof of Proposition 1, the first-order necessary condition of
Program (1.19) require that for some δ1t ∈ ∂u1(x1t) and δ2t ∈ ∂u2(x2t), we have that
δ1t[u
2(x2t) − u
2(y2t)] = δ
2
t [u
1(x1t) − u
1(y1t)].
Since u1 is strictly increasing, defining the number
λt =
δ1t
u1(x1t) − u
1(y1t)
> 0,
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we get that
δit = λt[u
i(xit) − v
i
t].
Now, if we also pick δit ∈ ∂ui(yit) > 0, µit = ui(xit) and vit = ui(yit), we get Eqs. (1.20)
to (1.23) from the fact that u1 and u2 are strictly concave, while we get Eq. (1.24)
from their strict monotonicity, given that xit > yit by assumption. The other two
conditions, Eqs. (1.25) and (1.26), also follow from monotonicity. Q.E.D.
Since we now need to account for more points in the domains of the utility
functions, the system of inequalities in this setting is more complex. The first con-
dition in the system, Eq. (1.20), compares the utility level at the attained income
of observation t ′ with its first-order approximation around the attained income of
observation t. This was the same comparison that we had in the system of Propo-
sition 1. Now, we also need to compare the utility level at the default income of
observation t ′ with its linear approximation around the default income of obser-
vation t, which is done by Eq. (1.21); the utility level at the attained income of
observation t ′ with its linear approximation around the default income of obser-
vation t, which is Eq. (1.22); and the utility at the default income of observation
t ′ with its approximation around the attained income of observation t, namely Eq.
(1.23). Importantly, while the hypothesis of rationalizability imposes a condition on
the derivatives of the utility functions at the attained income levels (i.e., the equality
given by the first-order condition of Program (1.19)), their derivatives at the default
income levels are only constrained to be positive.
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These extra conditions have to be imposed as part of the system, for otherwise
we cannot guarantee its sufficiency, which we obtain in the following result.
P 7. Given a data set of the form (1.18), suppose that there exists an array
of numbers {
(µ1t,µ2t , v1t, v2t , δ1t, δ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the system of inequalities defined in Proposition 6. Then, the data set is
rationalizable and, moreover, the utility functions that rationalize it can be constructed
in the class C2.
Proof: The argument resembles the proof of Proposition 2. Given a solution
{
(µ1t,µ2t , v1t, v2t , δ1t, δ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
to the system of inequalities, construct the functions
ui0(x) := min
{
min
{
µit + λt(µ
i
t − v
i
t)(x− x
i
t), vit + δit(x− yit)
}
: t = 1, . . . , T
}
.
which satisfy that ui0(xit) = µit and ui0(yit) = vit.16
Taking, as before, any pair (x1, x2) 6= (x1t, x2t) that is feasible in the program
max
x1,x2
{
[u10(x
1) − v1t][u
2
0(x
2) − v2t ] : x
1 + x2 6 Xt and ui0(xi) > vit
}
,
we still get that
0 < ui0(xi) − vit 6 µit + λt(µit − vit)(x− xit) − vit.
16 And which are continuous, concave and strictly increasing, and are C∞ at all but a finite
number of points in R.
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Since this is what was required for the argument of Proposition 2, we can omit the
remaining details. Q.E.D.
Importantly, the conditions that are added to the system are still polynomial
inequalities, so the set of arrays
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt,y1t,y2t , v1t, v2t ,µ1t,µ2t , δ1t, δ2t , λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that satisfy the system is semi-algebraic, and so is, therefore, its projection into
the space of data. As before, this set is, thus, characterized by a finite set of poly-
nomial inequalities, which constitute the strongest possible test of the hypothesis
of rationalizability in this setting. Assuming that the utility functions that ratio-
nalize the data are C2, we can see that the test is not a tautology by replacing
dvi = ∂ui(yi)dyi in Eq. (1.12), in order to obtain comparative statics for the case
that we are considering: dx1 now equals the ratio of
{
∂2u2(x2)[u1(x1) − u1(y1)] − ∂u1(x1)∂u2(x2)
}
dX
−∂u2(x2)∂u1(y1)dy1 + ∂u1(x1)∂u2(y2)dy2
and
∂2u1(x1)[u2(x2) − u2(y2)] − 2∂u1(x1)∂u2(x2) + ∂2u2(x2)[u1(x1) − u1(y1)].
Under monotonicity, the latter implies that no set that contains a pair of observa-
tions for which
Xt > Xt ′ ,y1t > y1t ′ ,y2t < y2t ′ and x1t < x1t ′
can be rationalized. Thus, the following proposition summarizes these observations.
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P 8. There exists a non-tautological condition that a data set of form
(1.18) satisfies if, and only if, it is rationalizable by utility functions in the class C2.
Moreover, this condition is a finite set of polynomial inequalities on
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt,y1t,y2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
.
.. B  U D I L
The analysis of the case when default income levels are observed allows us to
address a weakness that our previous results display. Consider again the setting of
Section 1.2.1, where we have data of the form (1.3). Our definition of rationalizability
in that section did not require the existence of an unobserved default income level
at which the individuals would obtain the observed default utility levels under our
construction of the utility functions: indeed, the definition of rationalizability does
not require that there exist numbers
{(y1t,y2t) : t = 1, . . . , T }
such that u1(y1t) = v1t and u2(y2t) = v2t at all observations. And while our con-
struction in Proposition 2 delivers us this extra requirement, for the functions ui
constructed in the proof are unbounded below, it may still be the case that in such
construction the implicit yit for which ui(yit) = vit is not plausible from the point of
view of the analyst, for some i and some t – for instance, it could be the case that
such income level has to be allowed to take negative values.
This problem can be addressed by extending the system of Proposition 1 in
36
the same way as Eqs. (1.20) to (1.26). For instance, let Yit ⊆ R be a nonempty
set of default income levels that the analyst considers possible for individual i at
observation t, and denote by Y the collection of all these constraints:
Y :=
{
(Y1t , Y2t ) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
.
Say that a data set of the form 1.3 is rationalizable with respect to Y if there exist
utility functions u1 : R→ R and u2 : R→ R, both of which are C2, strictly increasing
and strictly concave, and default income levels
{
(y1t,y2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
such that (i) at each observation t, the pair (x1t, x2t) solves Program (1.1); (ii) at each
observation t, the default income levels are feasible, in the sense that y1t ∈ Y1t and
y2t ∈ Y2t ; and (iii) the default income levels deliver the observed default utilities: for
all t, u1(y1t) = v1t and u2(y2t) = v2t .
The following analysis strengthens the results of Section 1.2.1 for this definition
of rationalizability. In addition to the assumptions introduced there, we here assume
that all the sets Yit contain at least one y < xit. As the results can be proven by
arguments similar to the ones given in Section 1.4, we state them without a detailed
proof.
P 9. Fix the collection Y of constraints. A data set of the form (1.18) is
rationalizable with respect to Y if, and only if, there exists an array of numbers
{
(µ1t,µ2t ,y1t,y2t , δ1t, δ1t, λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the system of equations (1.20) to (1.26), with yit ∈ Yit and yit < xit for all i
and all t. If, moreover, all the constraints in Y are semi-algebraic, then there exists a
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non-tautological condition that a data set satisfies if, and only if, it is rationalizable
with respect to Y. This condition is a finite set of polynomial inequalities on
{
(x1t, x2t ,Xt, v1t, v2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
.
Proof: Only the fact that the condition imposed by the hypothesis of rationaliz-
ability with respect to Y is non-tautological requires a comment. The reason why
this is the case is, simply, that if a set is rationalizable with respect to Y then it
is rationalizable (in the sense of Section 1.2.1). But since there are data sets that
cannot be rationalized, then there are sets that cannot be rationalizable with respect
to Y and it follows that the projection of the set of solutions to the system defined
in the proposition into the space of data has to be a proper subset of that space.
Since we are assuming that all the sets in Y are semi-algebraic, the fact that the
condition is non-tautological is implied by the Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem. Q.E.D.
.. A S T
A possible weakness of the results we have obtained so far is the lack of a measure
of how strong a rejection of the hypothesis of rationalizability is: that is, the
application of our tests is dichotomic in the sense that a data set is rationalizable
or not, but when a test is not rationalizable we still do not know how big or small
a perturbation to the data would make it consistent with the hypothesis. If a very
‘small’ perturbation to one of the observations sufficed for the data set to pass the
test of rationalizability, the analyst may want to consider the data consistent with
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the hypothesis, attributing the ‘small error’ to causes like, for instance, an error in
the collection of the data.
This criticism is common to all the basic literature on revealed preferences, but
can be addressed by extending the analysis in the direction of the construction
of statistical versions of the test (as is done in that literature as well) following,
Varian (1985).
For the most plausible framework, suppose that the observed data consists of
{
(x1t, x2t ,y1t,y2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
,
as in Section 1.4, only with the caveat that we now let Xt be constructed as x1t + x2t ,
instead of it being observed.17 The analyst may believe that the real income of
individual i at observation t was xit+ εxi,t, and that her default income was yit+ ε
y
i,t,
accounting for measurement error by the (unobserved) perturbations
ε :=
{
(εx1,t, εx2,t, ε
y
1,t, ε
y
2,t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
In this setting, as in Varian (1985), we can construct a statistical version of the
test of rationalizability. First, let D be the set of all values of
{
(x˘1t, x˘2t , y˘1t, y˘2t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that satisfy the condition given by Proposition 3, using X˘t = x˘1t+ x˘2t (or, equivalently
for which there exist a solution to the system of conditions defined in Eqs. (1.20)
to (1.26)). Second, for the array
e :=
{
(ex1,t, ex2,t, e
y
1,t, e
y
2,t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
,
17 The reason for this will be apparent momentarily.
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define χ as the minimum value of the sum of squared errors, e · e, subject to the
constraint that
(x1t + e
x
1,t, x2t + ex2,t,y1t + e
y
1,t,y
2
t + e
y
2,t)
T
t=1 ∈ D.
Under the assumption that the perturbations vector ε follows a normal distribu-
tion with mean (0, . . . ,0) and variance-covariance matrix σI, it is immediate that
χ/σ follows the χ2 distribution with 4T degrees of freedom. This statistic can be
used to test the hypothesis of rationalizability, using the null hypothesis that χ = 0.
.. G: A B  A
N  P
The results we have obtained so far can be generalized to an arbitrary numbers of
players whose bargaining powers may differ (but are assumed to be constant). For
simplicity of presentation, we concentrate on the setting where default utility levels
are observed.
That is, suppose that the analyst has observed data of the form
{
(xit, vit) : i = 1, . . . , I and t = 1, . . . , T
}
, (1.27)
and let Xt :=
∑
i x
i
t. Fix a vector α = (α1, . . . ,αI)  0, and say that one such data
set is α-rationalizable if there exist utility functions ui : R → R, for i = 1, . . . , I,
all of which are C2, strictly increasing and strictly concave, such that each vector
(x1t, . . . , xIt) solves the program
max
(x1,...,xI)
{∏
i[u
i(xi) − vit]
αi :
∑
i x
i 6 Xt and ui(xi) > vit
}
, (1.28)
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where the coefficient αi > 0 represents individual i’s bargaining power.18
As in Section 1.2.1, the first-order conditions of this problem are that for all
individuals we have that
αi∂u
i(xit)
ui(xit) − v
i
t
= λt, (1.29)
for some λt > 0.19 For all individuals, then,
∂ui(xit) =
1
αi
λt[u
i(xit) − v
i
t].
Since ui is strictly concave, the latter implies that, for all x ∈ R, x 6= xit,
ui(x) < ui(xit) +
1
αi
λt[u
i(xit) − v
i
t](x− x
i
t),
and, therefore, defining the numbers µit := ui(xit), we have proved the following
proposition:
P 10. Let α 0. If a data set of form (1.27) is α-rationalizable, then there
exists an array of numbers
{
(µ1t, . . . ,µIt, λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the following system:
µit ′ 6 µit +
1
αi
λt(µ
i
t − v
i
t)(x
i
t ′ − x
i
t), (1.30)
18 Note that the vector α is part of the hypothesis being tested. That is, the researcher must specify
the bargaining powers that are to be tested. We do not consider the weaker hypothesis of whether
there exist some bargaining powers under which the data can be rationalized, which would amount
to the introduction of an existential quantifier for α in the system below.
19 With a slight abuse of notation, we now use ∂ui to denote the derivative of function ui, given
that we have assumed that these functions are all differentiable.
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with strict inequality if xit ′ 6= xit,
µit > v
i
t, (1.31)
and
λt > 0. (1.32)
Perhaps it is not surprising, but it is important that the necessary condition we
just proposed is sufficient as well.
P 11. Given a data set of form (1.27) and a vector α  0, suppose that
there exists an array of numbers
{
(µ1t, . . . ,µIt, λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the system of inequalities defined in Proposition 10. Then, the data set is
α-rationalizable.
Proof: Given the array
{
(µ1t, . . . ,µIt, λt) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
that solves the system of in-
equalities, construct, for each player i,
ui0(x) := min
{
µit +
1
αi
λt(µ
i
t − v
i
t)(x− x
i
t) : t = 1, . . . , T
}
,
mapping R into R. This functions gives ui0(xit) = µit at all t, is continuous, concave
and strictly increasing, and is C∞ at all but a finite number of points in R. Since
the inequalities are strict, using the argument presented in Appendix A, the function
can be transformed into a C2, strictly concave and strictly increasing function ui
such that ui(xit) = ui0(xit) and ∂ui(xit) = ∂ui0(xit).
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With these constructions, since Program (1.28) is log-concave, it suffices to show
that vector (x1t, . . . , xIt) satisfies its first-order conditions, namely Eq. (1.29), for it to
be its solution. But this is immediate, by construction, for
αi∂u
i(xit)
ui(xit) − v
i
t
=
αi∂u
i
0(x
i
t)
ui0(x
i
t) − v
i
t
= λt
for all i. Q.E.D.
Also, the comparative statics of Eq. (1.12) generalize to the current setting. For
instance, keeping for simplicity the assumption that there are only two players but
letting their bargaining powers be α1 and α2, we get that
dx1 =
{
α2∂
2u2(x2)[u1(x1) − v1] − α1∂u
1(x1)∂u2(x2)
}
dX− α2∂u2(x2)dv1 + α1∂u1(x1)dv2
α1∂2u1(x1)[u2(x2) − v2] − (α1 + α2)∂u1(x1)∂u2(x2) + α2∂2u2(x2)[u1(x1) − v1]
,
which suffices to imply that no data set can be α-rationalized if it contains a pair
of distinct observations, t and t ′, such that
Xt > Xt ′ , v1t > v1t ′ , v2t < v2t ′ and x1t < x1t ′ .
(In the case of I players, if there are t and t ′, such that
Xt > Xt ′ , v1t > v1t ′ , vit < vit ′ for all i 6= 1 and x1t < x1t ′ .)
In consequence, we have proven the following result.
P 12. Let α 0. There exists a non-tautological condition that a data set
of form (1.27) satisfies if, and only if, it is α-rationalizable. Moreover, this condition
is a finite set of polynomial inequalities on
{
(xit, vit) : i = 1, . . . , I and t = 1, . . . , T
}
.
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.. C
We study the empirical implications of the Nash bargaining solution, assuming that
the outside analyst observes a finite set of bargaining outcomes, under different
hypotheses about the behaviour of the disagreement levels. We first consider a
model where two agents bargain over the division of an aggregate endowment, and
follow a revealed preference approach to verify the empirical validity of the Nash
bargaining solution. In addition, we extend our study for the case of n agents,
whose bargaining power may be asymmetric (but constant).
We derive a revealed preference characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
for the cases where default levels are observed, and when the analyst has some
information on the behaviour of the disagreement levels, for instance, invariance
of unobserved default utility levels. Furthermore, we recover refutability under the
hypothesis that the disagreement point, while not being observed or invariant, is
weakly co-montone with the aggregate resource, in the case of one agent and weakly
anti-comonotone with the aggregate resource for the other.
We use the Tarski-Sidenberg algorithm to construct the type of test an observer
can develop to claim the hypothesis that the data can be explained by using the Nash
bargaining solution. We also construct a statistical version of the rationalizability
test, to give specific content as to when we can attribute the failure of the hypothesis
of rationalizability to measurement error.
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.. I
The extent to which political science and economics have modeled electoral com-
petition, is ample, and in many cases diametrically opposed. Downs (1957) used
Hotelling’s (1929) model of spatial competition to explain a competition between two
candidates whose motivation for practising politics is to enjoy benefits and power
of governing. A key assumption is that, voters care about policies and therefore
they would vote for the candidate (or party) who was closest to his or her political
standpoint, yet candidates are solely motivated by the desire to win office as an
opportunity to enjoy a successful career. This, in turn, drove parties to adopt the
political standpoint of the median voter. The history of democracy has showed
us that political parties are both formed and influenced by interest and advocacy
groups which have cared about policies. So, to propose a model in which candidates
do not care about policies was viewed to be historically inaccurate.
Contrary to Downs, Wittman (1973) proposed a model of electoral competition
in which parties have policy goals, which does not mean that politicians are ideo-
logically dogmatic or lethargic about winning elections, or even value the position
of their platform as an end in itself, but, like voters, candidates are solely interested
in policy implementation. Although Wittman managed to overcome the ahistorical
feature of the Downs model, that is, he modeled political competition between par-
ties that have policy preferences, he could not escape the conclusion that political
equilibria consists of both parties playing the same policy.1
1 This common result hods for the case when both parties know for certain the distribution of
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Together with the assumptions about candidates’ motivation and parties not
having complete information about voters’ preferences Calvert (1985) concluded
that, in equilibrium, as long as candidates share the same beliefs about the electorate
both parties propose the same policies. Using the same changes in the traditional
assumptions as Wittman (1977), Calvert gradually departed from the former results.2
Nonetheless, both strong policy orientation and uncertainty will lead to candidate
divergence, as Wittman had claimed. But, if policy orientation and uncertainty
are limited then only small perturbations of candidate convergence emerge.3 Put
differently, the median policy result is quite robust to changes in its key assumptions:
candidate motivation or uncertainty.
A major drawback of models in electoral competition with a unidimensional
policy space, is that they predict a unique equilibrium in which party platforms are
identical, which is seldom observed. A possible explanation for these findings is that
they fail to recognize voters’ uncertainty about the candidates. In other words, they
neglect the importance of voters’ expectations as a determinant of votes. Among
those that offered an alternative approach are Berndhardt and Ingerman (1985)
voters types in a unidimensional policy space. However, if candidates are uncertain about vote
behaviour, in other words, if they know the probability distribution over the possible distribution of
voter types in a one dimensional policy space, Downs continued to predict that, in equilibrium, both
candidates propose identical policies, whereas Wittman predicted differentiated equilibria.
2 If candidates are not motivated by the desire to win office, but, by the quality of the policies
that follow from an election, in a k-issue space, both candidates propose equilibrium policies that
will diverge, Wittman (1983).
3 If both these non-standard assumptions are made together, the convergence result no longer
holds, see Calvert (1985).
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who introduced the idea that voters’ choices are influenced by their expectations
about the candidates. One can argue that by allowing voters to treat candidates’
positions as lotteries over uncertain outcomes, classical models had, indeed, intro-
duced voter’s uncertainty about the candidates. Although the motivation of these
models had been to study if a candidate preferred, or not, a more or less noisy lot-
tery, they also suggest that voters’ subjective probabilistic valuation of post-election
outcomes, given the election of candidate a as candidate a had changed his an-
nounced position, could explain why (i) incumbents were difficult to defeat and (ii)
the lack of political platform convergence to the median platform. They construct a
spatial model to explain political competition between two candidates where voters’
expectations are treated explicitly. They found that a candidate can win election de-
pending on (i) how well the incumbents past announcements reflect the electorates’
current position and (ii) how relatively risky voters perceive the challenger to be.
Their predictions, appeared to be consistent with the persistent findings in empirical
studies. More importantly, they move away from the median policy result and find
that, in equilibrium, candidates choose different platforms.
Contrary to the existence of equilibria in the one-dimensional policy space, an
important result of models with multidimensional issue spaces and party certainty
about voter behaviour is that equilibria, both in the Downs and Wittman4 models,
typically fail to exist. Without failing to recognize the importance of this result, par-
ties seldom compete in an environment of complete certainty, hence, an alternative
4 Only trivial interior Wittman equilibria exist generically in the multidimensional case, whereas
an interior Downs equilibrium exists only nongenerically.
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by which researchers have gotten around the non-existence of Nash equilibria in
pure strategies in games of electoral competition under uncertainty when the policy
space is multidimensional5, has been to change the game played between parties
from a simultaneous one to a sequential game, in which case, the Stackelberg equi-
librium generally exists in the multidimensional, two-party game. But, who should
be the one to move first? The incumbent or the challenger? Moreover, to define
a natural order or an imperative argument by which one can label one of the two
parties a natural leader6 has been open for debate.
Another important contribution in the multidimensional set-up has been when
answering the question as to why parties adopt progressive income tax rules, for
which it is necessary to augment the issue space to more than one dimension so
that, at least, progressive and regressive tax income policies be represented. Based
on the evidence of the twentieth-century European political history of inner-party
struggle over the policy space, Roemer (1999), introduced a new equilibrium concept
called, party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) to overcome the non-existence of
Nash equilibria. He assumed that there exist three types of politicians in each
party, and each party must reach inner-party unanimity before the platform is
announced, hence, before it is ready to be revealed in the electoral contest. He
used the criterion of Pareto efficiency from the point of view of each of the types
within the party, given the other party’s policy, to solve the problem of existence in a
multidimensional setting. Furthermore, despite introducing factional conflict within
5 See Coughlin (1992), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)
6 See, Roemer (2001).
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parties,7 Roemer’s framework does not explicitly model the strategic interactions
taking place within each party.
Along the same vein, we adopt Roemer’s institutional assumption that in reality,
parties seldom act as unitary actors; on the contrary, members have different and
somewhat conflicting preferences and each party consists of three types of politi-
cians. This paper presents a new equilibrium concept for games of political com-
petition where candidates, who belong to intra-party factions, must unanimously
agree on which platform to announce in the electoral contest. More importantly,
we investigate electoral competition within each party and their choice of political
platforms by using a specific bargaining protocol to model party members strategic
interactions and incentives. The heart of our equilibrium concept consists of in-
voking Baron and Ferejohn (1989) bargaining protocol (hereafter, B.F), to explicitly
model what happens within each party’s internal-decision process. Contrary to Roe-
mer’s formulation, where each faction member, 8 in an attempt to secure its best
outcome, evaluates whether to deviate, or not, from a tax policy to another, when
the other faction is playing a policy t, our solution concept entails an additional
7 In order to study why, typically, both the left and right parties propose progressive income
tax schemes in political competition. For related literature on political competition in non-unitary
parties, internal party organization and the effect of the interaction between parties and candidates
on platforms, see, Caulliad and Tirole (2002), Testa (2003), Castanheira et al. (2010) and Perisco
et al. (2007).
8 In Roemer (2001), one of the three factions called the reformists, play no active role in his
solution concept, therefore the political equilibrium arises from a inner-party struggle between the
remaining two factions
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source of uncertainty. Despite the similarities between Roemer’s setting and ours,
we model each members’ decision as if he were uncertain about, (i) the faction that
will eventually dominate the decision made by the other party and (ii) the faction
that will dominate in the party’s nomination. While Roemer models each party
members’ decision as if he were certain of the type of politician that represents the
opposing party.
From a theoretical standpoint, what if Pareto efficiency may not be sustainable.
Now, even though Roemer’s solution concept was meant to overcome the problem
of existence of Nash equilibria in a multidimensional setup, we will assume a uni-
dimensional policy space since our motivation is not to offer an alternative for
solving the problem of existence in a multidimensional framework, but, mainly to
model the strategic incentives of faction members in a party and their choice of a
political platform. Evidence shows that due to different and somewhat conflicting
preferences members face an inter-party struggle over the policy space and so by
modelling what goes on behind close doors within each we find that Roemer’s equi-
librium concept may result inadequate for political competition in certain settings,
for example, those where primary debates are held. Put differently, we show that
Roemer’s solution concept may not serve as an appropriate analytical description of
any political competition context.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, we present the fundamental
setting in which our results will be obtained, introduce some necessary assump-
tions and borrow Roemer’s definitions for each faction. In Section 2.3, we present
Roemer’s solution concept, introduce an alternative specification of intra-party bar-
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gaining that is consistent with Roemer’s results and present some additional new
assumptions and definitions we need for our solution concept. In section 2.4, we
present a complete characterization of our equilibrium concept, intra-party voting
Nash equilibrium. In Section 2.5, which is the main section of this chapter, we
report the basic Nash equilibria, party unanimity Nash equilibria, Nash bargaining
solution and our intra-party voting Nash equilibria for the game of electoral com-
petition and present part of our main results. In section 2.6, we claim the reason
intra-party unanimity Nash equilibria fails to exercise the efficiency property that
Roemer’s solution concept displays, lies on the fact that each party’s factions are
choosing uncertain about the policy that the other party will propose. In section
2.7, we conclude.
.. P E  B A
In this section we establish the setting in which all our results will be obtained,
and introduce some assumptions that will be maintained throughout the paper.
These assumptions are rather restrictive, but they suffice for us to make the main
observations of the paper in the simplest possible setting. Of course, the assumptions
are not needed for the definitions we use in the paper – neither for the ones we
borrow from the literature, nor for the one that we introduce here.
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2.2.1. Fundamentals of the political contest
Suppose that two parties, denoted by L and R, are competing to gain the support
of some constituency in a given election. Let the policy space be the set A, and
suppose that each party, i ∈ {L,R}, has an ideology function vi : A → R, which
represents how much the party values different policies, according to its political
principles.
The population of voters is represented by the distribution of political preferences.
This distribution is summarized by the function pi : A×A→ [0, 1], which measures
the popular support for party L: if (aL,aR) is the pair of policies chosen by the two
parties, then pi(aL,aR) measures the proportion of the constituency that supports
party L. We will assume that there is no abstention in the constituency, so that
under the same pair of policies the support for party R is 1− pi(aL,aR).
2.2.2. Basic assumptions
We assume that the policy space, A, is a subset of the one-dimensional Euclidean
space R, endowed with its natural pre-order and its natural topology, and that both
ideology functions, vL and vR, are continuous. Justifying our choice of jargon, so
that we can refer to party L as the left and to party R as the right, we will assume
that there exist policies a∗,a∗ ∈ A such that (i) a∗ 6 a∗; (ii) function vL is decreasing
on [a∗,∞) ∩A; and (iii) function vR is increasing on (∞,a∗] ∩A.9
9 If both numbers exist, this assumption implies that argmaxavR(a) > argmaxavL(a).
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Also, we assume that function pi is continuous at all (aL,aR) with aL 6= aR,
and impose that if aR > aL, then pi is non-decreasing in both arguments; while if
aL > aR then pi is non-increasing in both arguments. Finally, for all our results we
will assume that the voters have no party affiliation, in the sense that
pi(a ′,a ′′) = 1− pi(a ′′,a ′),
for any pair of policies a ′,a ′′ ∈ A.10
2.2.3. Types of Politicians
As in Roemer (1999), in each party there are three types of politicians: those who
only care about the ideological value of the policy chosen by their party, those who
only care about the popular support that their party obtains in the election, and those
who care about the ideological value of the policy that is actually implemented as
a result of the election.
Militant
The first type of politician, which will be referred to as militant, only cares about
the policy chosen by its party, measured according to the party’s ideology function:
if the pair of policies chosen is (aL,aR), then the values given by the militant
politicians of each party are vL(aL) and vR(aR).11
10 This assumption implies that pi(a,a) = 1/2 for any policy a.
11 Refer to Appendix B.1 for proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium between militants.
55
Opportunist
The second type of politician, which shall be called opportunist, values a pair of
policies (aL,aR) by the support that this pair entails to his own party: in the left, the
opportunists care about pi(aL,aR), while in the right they care about 1− pi(aL,aR).12
Let F : A→ [0, 1] be an increasing and continuous function such that
lima→infAF(a) = 0
and
lima→supAF(a) = 1,
and suppose that
pi(a ′,a ′′) =

F(a
′+a ′′
2 ), if a
′′ > a ′;
1
2 , if a
′ = a ′′;
1− F(a ′+a ′′2 ), if a
′′ < a ′.
Pragmatist
Finally, a politician shall be called a pragmatist if he cares about the policy that will
be implemented as a result of the election, valued according to his party’s ideology.13
12 See Appendix B.1 for the existence of a Nash equilibrium between opportunists.
13 In the original language of Roemer (1999), this type of politician is called a reformist. We are
not using this term, in order to preempt confusion between the “right” party and the “reformists” of
either party, in mnemonics that will be used later on in the paper. An alternative denomination for
this type of politician could be non-extremists, in the sense that they do not care simply about the
extremes of either pure ideology, or pure popular support, as the other two types of politicians do.
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Given the distribution of votes resulting from a pair (aL,aR) of policies, in the left
the pragmatist politicians care about
µL(aL,aR) := pi(aL,aR)vL(aL) + [1− pi(aL,aR)]vL(aR), (2.1)
while in the right they care about
µR(aL,aR) := pi(aL,aR)vR(aL) + [1− pi(aL,aR)]vR(aR). (2.2)
It will later be useful to observe that each function µi is continuous in ai at all
(aL,aR), in spite of the possible discontinuity of function pi when aL = aR.
.. P-U N E
Roemer (1999) introduced a concept of equilibrium that presumes the fact that the
three types of politician are present in the membership of each party, and that a
consensus must be obtained from these three factions of the party before the party’s
policy can be adopted. In Roemer’s formulation, the intra-party decision process
is unmodeled. Meanwhile, he adopts the view that whatever internal process is
adopted by each party in order to choose its platform will lead to an efficient
choice, using the criterion of Pareto efficiency for the membership of the party.
2.3.1. The concept of equilibrium
A party-unanimity Nash equilibrium is a pair of policies (aL,aR) such that:
(i) @a ∈ A for which,
vL(a) > vL(aL),pi(a,aR) > pi(aL,aR) and µL(a,aR) > µL(aL,aR),
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with at least one of the three inequalities being strict;
(ii) @a ∈ A such that,
vR(a) > vR(aR),pi(aL,a) 6 pi(aL,aR) and µR(aL,a) > µR(aL,aR),
with, again, at least one of these inequalities being strict.
It is worthy of mentioning that at a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium, each
party takes as given the policy platform chosen by its opposition, and chooses for
itself a platform that is Pareto efficient platform from the point of view of its
membership. In this sense, all three factions of the left will consider deviating from
policy aL to a, when the right is playing aR, if all three factions from the left are
not worse off by playing a and at least one of them is strictly better off. Conversely,
the same may be said for the case of the right. In the remainder of the paper,
we shall also use the term Roemer equilibrium to refer to a Party Unanimity Nash
Equilibrium.
In order to simplify the application of Roemer’s concept, the following claim is
true: There does not exist a Roemer equilibrium (aL,aR) such that vL(aR) > vL(aL),
or that vR(aL) > vR(aR). As shown in Appendix B.2, we prove our claim.
An important property of Roemer’s equilibrium solution concept, which he makes
explicit in Roemer (2001), is that the pragmatists of each party are inconsequential
for the equilibrium choice of policies. To see that this is indeed the case, refer to
Appendix B.3.
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2.3.2. The Nash bargaining solution and Roemer equilibrium
Presumably, the outcome of an intra-party decision process is not independent of
the importance that each of the factions has in the party. Along this line, the fact
that pragmatist politicians play no role in the choice of their party’s policy under
a Roemer equilibrium may thus appear as a shortcoming of the concept. Like we
mentioned earlier, by offering a natural intra-party decision process under which
PUNE results inadequate as a solution concept for political competition, we provide
an alternative equilibrium concept for political games when Pareto efficiency is not
sustainable. What do we mean by offering a natural decision process? Although
in most presidential systems, the president is elected by popular vote, it isn’t a
surprise that party factions engage in negotiations, despite the common interest in
agreement, they still have conflicting preferences among each other. For instance,
United States use caucuses and nationwide state level primaries to elect a candidate
for office that will narrow the field of candidates before the general election. But,
what if Pareto efficiency isn’t not sustainable when party members decide over what
party platform to present. Furthermore, what if, instead, faction members negotiate
over the terms of the party platform to present, say, in the primaries. And as a
result, factions harm one another within the party as evidence suggests happens
during electoral races.
But before addressing our theoretical curiosity, we first introduce an alternative
specification of intra-party politics that is consistent with Roemer’s idea.
For each party, let αi,βi > 0 be two numbers such that αi + βi 6 1. Roemer
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(2001) defines a Nash bargaining solution with weights ((αL,βL), (αR,βR)) to be a
pair (aL,aR) such that policy aL solves program
max
a
{pi(a,aR)αL [vL(a) − vL(aR)]βL}, (2.3)
while policy aR solves program
max
a
{[1− pi(aL,a)]αR [vR(a) − vR(aL)]βR}. (2.4)
A pair (aL,aR) is said to be a Nash bargaining solution, if there exist numbers
((αL,βL), (αR,βR)) such that (aL,aR) is a Nash bargaining solution with the weights
((αL,βL), (αR,βR)).
This concept has a natural interpretation. Use αi to denote the proportion of
members of party i who are militant, and use βi for the proportion that are oppor-
tunistic; the remaining proportion, 1−αi−βi, are, implicitly, pragmatist politicians.
The definition corresponds to the assumption that, given the policy chosen by its
opposition, each party solves its decision process according to a weighted Nash
bargaining problem between the militant and opportunist factions, under the as-
sumption that both factions believe that if they break their discussion without some
agreed policy, then the other party will win the election for sure and will impose its
policy: for the opportunists, the “default” payoff implicit in these Nash problems is
0, as if the other party won the election for sure in the absence of an agreed policy
from their own party; and for the militants the default payoff is vi(a¬i), as if the
break-up of the party’s negotiations were tantamount to the adoption of the other
party’s policy.
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It is straightforward that if a pair of policies (aL,aR) is a Nash bargaining
solution with implicit weights ((αL,βL), (αR,βR)) that are all strictly positive, then it
is also a Roemer equilibrium: otherwise, it would be possible to increase the payoff
of one of the factions in one of the parties without decreasing the payoff of the
other faction of the same party; as long as the first faction’s weight in that party is
strictly positive, this would imply that one can increase to maximand of that party’s
problem in one of the two expressions, (2.3) or (2.4), thus contradicting the premise
that the pair of policies was a Nash bargaining solution. Under some technical
requirements on the ideology functions and the support function (pi), Roemer (2001)
further argues that any party-unanimity Nash equilibrium where no party wins the
election for sure is also a Nash bargaining solution.
2.3.3. The role of pragmatist politicians
We can use the characterization of Roemer equilibria via Nash bargaining solutions
to revisit the issue of the irrelevance of pragmatist politicians in Roemer’s analysis.
In principle, the definition of Nash bargaining solution has dismissed the existence
of the pragmatist faction of each party, and is such that the outcome of the political
competition only depends on the internal composition of the parties’ memberships
up to the ratio of the fractions of militants to opportunists. One attempt to bring
the pragmatist politicians back into the fray would be to include their values and
their weight into the Nash bargaining problem. That is, let us consider the problem
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of the left, modified to
max
a
{pi(a,aR)αL [vL(a) − vL(aR)]βL [µL(a,aR) − µL]1−αL−βL},
for some default value µL, which may depend on aR and represents the value
that a pragmatist politician from the left would attach to the failing of his own
party’s internal decision process. If one wants to be consistent with the idea that
all politicians render a failure in the internal negotiations of their parties as a
capitulation in the political competition, then the value that should be given to the
default µL should be precisely vL(aR), for in such case the practical politicians in
the left party believe that the right is going to implement policy aR for sure. Now,
in this case, using, namely Equation (2.1),
pi(a,aR)αL [vL(a) − vL(aR)]βL [µL(a,aR) − µ]1−αL−βL = pi(a,aR)1−βL [vL(a) − vL(aR)]1−αL ,
so it follows, once again, that the practical politicians play no significant role: the
outcome of the left party’s decision process is going to depend on the distribution
of types only up to the ratio of 1− αL to 1− βL.
.. I-P V N E
The relationship between party-unanimity Nash equilibria and Nash bargaining so-
lutions is seen by Roemer as a micro-foundation for the premise that each party’s
platform should be efficient from the point of view of its membership, given the
other party’s policy.14 In contexts in which such premise is acceptable, one can
14 Indeed, in Roemer’s applications of his equilibrium concept, he uses the observed policy propos-
als to back out, under the assumption that the pair of policies is a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium,
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take Roemer’s equilibrium concept as an appropriate analytical description of the
political context, and may use the Nash bargaining solution as its microfoundation
of what happens within each of the competing parties. We do not, however, be-
lieve that all political situations are amenable to the premise of inter-party Pareto
efficiency. Consider, for instance, the case of presidential systems in which pre-
candidates from each party first compete for their party’s nomination in a primary
vote. The political debate before the primaries is often heated, and the criticism
that the eventual winner receives from fellow pre-candidates is later on used by
the other party’s nominee in the presidential race. This cannot be Pareto efficient:
each party would prefer, given the eventual choice of a nominee, to have had a less
damaging debate in its primary.
Also, in the Roemer-Nash framework, each party is modeled as choosing a policy
platform given the platform of the other party. In the presence of different factions
in each party, we find this objectionable, for it is as if each party knew which of
the factions is eventually going to dominate the decision made by the other party.
In the language of the presidential primary elections, it is as if each of the pre-
candidates of a party knew who is going to be the eventual nominee of the other
party – indeed, an untenable assumption.
We now propose a concept of equilibrium that tries to overcome these two prob-
lems. We believe that this concept is appropriate for contests with significant pri-
the normalized weights of the militant and opportunist factions of each party. At a theoretical level,
Roemer argues that the set of party-unanimity Nash equilibria constitutes a manifold, and that the
profiles of weights ((αL,βL), (αR,βR)) are a parameterization of it.
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mary debates, under the premise that the discussion behind the intra-party decisions
is binding for the posterior inter-party competition. We maintain the assumption
that the proportion of militant politicians in party i is αi, the proportion of oppor-
tunists is βi, and the remaining members, 1−αi−βi, are pragmatist. For simplicity,
we will denote the type of politician by t ∈ {m,o,p}, with obvious mnemonics.
In each party, each type of politician will have a policy proposal, which we
denote by ai,t ∈ A. We distinguish a policy that party i may adopt, from the
triple of policies adopted by its factions, by using ai ∈ A for the former while
~ai = (ai,m,ai,o,ai,p) ∈ A3 denotes the latter. We will also denote the pair of policy
triples by ~a = (~aL, ~aR) ∈ A3 ×A3.
2.4.1. Objective functions under uncertainty
Consider a politician from party L. From his point of view, the type of politician
of party R against whom he will compete for votes, should he win the nomination
from his party, is unknown: he believes that he will face a militant with probability
αR, an opportunist with probability βR and a pragmatist with probability 1−αR−βR.
Now, suppose that party L is considering the adoption of a policy a; if the policy of
party R is aR, then the expected value of this politician is vL(a), pi(a,aR) or
µL(a,aR) := pi(a,aR)vL(a) + [1− pi(a,aR)]vL(aR),
depending on whether he is of type m, o or p. But, as we said before, this politician
does not know who is going to win party R’s nomination, so, given a triple ~aR, his
values are as follows, depending on his type: if he is a militant, it is VL(a, ~aR) :=
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vL(a), for he does not care about R’s policy; if he is an opportunist, his value is
ΠL(a, ~aR) := αRpi(a,aR,m) + βRpi(a,aR,o) + (1− αR − βR)pi(a,aR,p);
and, similarly, if he is a pragmatist, his value is
ML(a, ~aR) := αRµL(a,aR,m) + βRµL(a,aR,o) + (1− αR − βR)µL(a,aR,p).
Of course, the definitions of objective functions for the factions of party R, which
we will denote by µR, ΠR andMR are similar, except for the fact that its opportunists
care about 1− pi:
ΠR(~aL,a) := αL[1− pi(aL,m,a)] + βL[1− pi(aL,o,a)] + (1− αL − βL)[1− pi(aL,p,a)]
The other details are omitted.
2.4.2. Objective functions over own party’s policy triple
In the expected value functions just defined, the only uncertainty is over the type
of politician that will represent the opposing party, but the policy considered by
the politician’s own party is given. For reasons that will be clear momentarily,
we will need to define the expected value of each type of politician, ex-ante to
the determination of his own party’s nominee. That is to say, fix a pair of policy
triples ~a, and consider again a politician from party L; if he believes that his party
is going to be represented by one of its militants with probability αL, by one of
its opportunists with probability βL, and by one of its pragmatists with probability
1− αL − βL, then his values are as follows: if he himself is a militant, it is
VeL(~a) = αLVL(aL,m, ~aR) + βLVL(aL,o, ~aR) + (1− αL − βL)VL(aL,p, ~aR);
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if he is an opportunist, his value is
ΠeL(~a) = αLΠL(aL,m, ~aR) + βLΠL(aL,o, ~aR) + (1− αL − βL)ΠL(aL,p, ~aR);
and, in the same vein, it is
MeL(~a) = αLML(aL,m, ~aR) + βLML(aL,o, ~aR) + (1− αL − βL)ML(aL,p, ~aR)
if he is a pragmatist.
As before, the definitions of ex-ante objective functions for the politicians of
party R are identical.
2.4.3. A protocol for the intra-party contest
The key difference between Roemer’s equilibrium concept and ours is the adoption
of an explicit bargaining protocol to model what happens in each party’s internal
decision process: we assume that the policy triple of each party is adopted at a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the protocol introduced by Baron and Ferejohn
(89), given the triple of the other party. We next describe this protocol.
In each party, i, the internal discussion takes place by a series of rounds. In
each round, a politician is chosen at random and he makes a policy proposal; after
the proposal is made, the members of the party vote to accept or reject the proposal.
The internal statutes of the party specify a proportion γi > 1/2 of «accept» votes
that are needed for a policy to be adopted by the party. If the round’s proposal
passes this threshold, it becomes the party’s policy. Otherwise, a new round begins,
again by randomly selecting, with replacement.
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We assume that party i’s politicians (uniformly) discount the value of an agreed
policy by a discount factor of δi < 1, for each round of negotiation that has passed
before this agreement has been reached. This impatience may reflect, for instance,
the loss of reputation that the party may suffer when the constituency realizes its
internal disagreement.
We use Baron and Ferejohn (1989) to introduce our concept of equilibrium. For
the sake of simplicity and tractability, we assume that in each party, all politicians
of a given type follow the same strategy, and focus on stationary subgame-perfect
equilibria of the intra-party game, so that delay in reaching an agreement does not
occur at equilibrium. Also, we assume implicitly that each politician votes to accept
the policy that he would propose should he be elected to do so.
2.4.4. Passing proposals
As before, for the sake of a simpler presentation, we concentrate on the case of
party L, and take as given the policy triple of party R, namely ~aR. The analysis of
party R is of course the same, mutatis mutandis.
Given aL,m and aL,p, we shall say that L’s militants vote to accept the proposal of
the opportunists, aL,o, if
VL(aL,o, ~aR) > δLVeL(~aL, ~aR),
with ~aR = (aL,m,aL,o,aL,p). This means that the militants are no worse off under the
current proposal of the opportunists than if they voted to reject it, given what they
expect as value for a further round of negotiation, discounted. Similarly, given aL,m
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and aL,o, L’s militants vote to accept the proposal of the pragmatists, aL,p, if
VL(aL,p, ~aR) > δLVeL(~aL, ~aR).
For the other types of politicians of party L the definitions are analogous, but
we provide them explicitly, for the sake of completeness. Given aL,o and aL,p, we
shall say that L’s opportunists vote to accept the proposal of the militants, aL,m, if
ΠL(aL,m, ~aR) > δLΠeL(~aL, ~aR),
and, given aL,m and aL,o, that L’s opportunists vote to accept the proposal of the
pragmatists, aL,p, if
ΠL(aL,p, ~aR) > δLΠeL(~aL, ~aR).
Also, given aL,o and aL,p, we shall we say that L’s pragmatists vote to accept the
proposal of the militants, aL,m, if
ML(aL,m, ~aR) > δLMeL(~aL, ~aR),
and, given aL,m and aL,p, that L’s pragmatists vote to accept the proposal of the
opportunists, aL,o, if
ML(aL,o, ~aR) > δLMeL(~aL, ~aR).
Given these definitions, we can define the constraints that the politicians of
each faction face when choosing a policy proposal. Again, we maintain fixed a
given triple, ~aR, for party R. Given aL,o and aL,p, we say that the proposal of the
militants, aL,m, passes if one of the following four conditions holds:
(a) αL > γL; or
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(b) the opportunists vote to accept aL,m and αL + βL > γL; or
(c) the pragmatists vote to accept aL,m and 1− βL > γL; or
(d) both the opportunists and the pragmatists vote to accept aL,m.
In words, the proposal of the militants passes if the number of party members
who prefer to adopt it, in comparison with letting the negotiation proceed for one
further round, is above the threshold required by the party’s statutes. This can
occur when the militants are sufficiently many to impose their policies without the
support of any other faction of the party (case a), when they can convince the
opportunists and together they pass that threshold (case b), when they can convince
the pragmatists and together they pass the threshold (case c), or when there is
unanimous support for the proposal (case d).
This idea extends to the other two factions of the party, straightforwardly; we
give the formal definitions next. Given aL,m and aL,p, we say that the proposal of
the opportunists, aL,o, passes if one of the following conditions holds:
(a) βL > γL; or
(b) the militants vote to accept aL,m and αL + βL > γL; or
(c) the pragmatists vote to accept aL,m and 1− αL > γL; or
(d) both the militants and the pragmatists vote to accept aL,m.
Similarly, given aL,m and aL,o, we say that the proposal of the pragmatists, aL,p,
passes if one of the following conditions holds:
(a) 1− αL − βL > γL; or
(b) the militants vote to accept aL,p and 1− βL > γL; or
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(c) the opportunists vote to accept aL,p and 1− αL > γL; or
(d) both the militants and the opportunists vote to accept aL,p.
2.4.5. The concept of equilibrium
Under the definitions previously introduced, we can introduce our concept of equi-
librium. Intuitively, we exploit the idea of Baron and Ferejohn (89), under which
each party reaches an agreement without delay, at a stationary subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the intra-party negotiation game, while we model the situation as
a simultaneous-move inter-party game, where we are interested in straightforward
Nash equilibria.
We say that a pair of policy profiles ~a = (~aL, ~aR) is an intra-party voting Nash
equilibrium (with thresholds (γL,γR)), if the following six conditions hold:
- Militants in party L are rational: platform aL,m solves the following opti-
mization problem:
max {VL(a, ~aR) : a passes, given (aL,o,aL,p) and ~aR}. (2.5)
- Opportunists in party L are rational: platform aL,o solves the following
optimization problem:
max {ΠL(a, ~aR) : a passes, given (aL,m,aL,p) and ~aR}. (2.6)
- Pragmatists in party L are rational: platform aL,p solves the following
optimization problem:
max {ML(a, ~aR) : a passes, given (aL,m,aL,o) and ~aR}. (2.7)
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- Militants in party R are rational: platform aR,m solves the following opti-
mization problem:
max {VR(~aL,a) : a passes, given (aR,o,aR,p) and ~aL}. (2.8)
- Opportunists in party R are rational: platform aR,o solves the following
optimization problem:
max {ΠR(~aL,a) : a passes, given (aR,m,aR,p) and ~aL}. (2.9)
- Pragmatists in party R are rational: platform aR,p solves the following
optimization problem:
max {MR(~aL,a) : a passes, given (aR,m,aR,o) and ~aL}. (2.10)
Intuitively, at an intra-party voting Nash equilibrium, no faction of either party
would prefer to unilaterally deviate from the policy it is adopting, given the policies
of the other two factions of its own party and the three factions of the opposing
party. They would not find it beneficial to adopt a different policy, in the sense
that the policies that would be supported by sufficiently many fellow members of
the party, the chosen policy is the one that is best according to the objective of
that faction. Implicit in the definition are two more elements of the strategy of all
politicians which are related to how they vote if it happens to be another member
of their own party who is chosen to make a proposal: first, that they support the
proposal that they themselves would make; and, second, that for any other proposal,
they vote in its support if, and only if, that policy gives them at least as much payoff,
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according to their own interest, as the expected payoff they would get from rejecting
the policy and running a new round of negotiations (where they would all make the
same proposals as in the previous round). These properties are important, because
they rule out trivial equilibria of standard majority games, where negligible players
vote in favor (or against) a proposal just because they do not have the power to
change the outcome of the vote.
Importantly, in our concept of equilibrium all politicians are selfish, in the sense
that they want to impose the policy that is best according to their own interests,
while none tries to ensure that the resulting party profile is efficient from the point
of view of their parties, at least not by design of the game. It is precisely this lack
of concern for the party’s «optimality»that we want to emphasize, for this is the
feature of Roemer’s equilibrium concept that, we believe, can often be untenable. In
order to capture the ideas of Roemer, however, we first specify a class of games in
which our concept is particularly amenable to comparison to his definition.
2.4.6. Intra-party unanimous voting Nash equilibrium
We shall say that an intra-party voting Nash equilibrium ~a = (~aL, ~aR) requires
unanimity, if the thresholds of the game are such that no coalition of just two
factions of a party can pass a policy proposal: for both i = L,R, the following is
true:
αi + βi < γi, 1− βi < γi and 1− αi < γi.
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Under this condition, a faction’s proposal in either party can only pass if the other
two factions of that party vote to accept it.15
.. I  I-P V E P
Our aim is to show that Roemer’s solution concept may fail to capture some aspects
of the political game, for instance, when intra-party competition is significant, for
instance, the case of presidential elections. The idea of Roemer is to capture the
property of unanimity through the application of intra-party efficiency of the cho-
sen platform, but without explicitly modeling the strategic interactions taking place
within each party. Conversely, we model the decision process of each party, with-
out the need for the unanimity property. However, in order to capture Roemer’s
premises, from now this point on we will restrict attention to intra-party voting
Nash equilibria that require unanimity.
Of course, between the two concepts there is a formal difference that we need to
address in order for the comparison to be meaningful: while a party unanimity Nash
equilibrium is a point in A×A, an intra-party voting Nash equilibrium is one in A3×
A3. It would not make sense to say that an outcome of the game is an equilibrium
under both definitions. At the same time, party-unanimity Nash equilibria are
often in multiplicity, and, as mentioned before, under simple assumptions they
constitute a manifold of policy pairs, parameterized by the values of (αL,βL) and
15 That is, if the reason why the proposal passes is given by condition (d) in the definitions of
passing proposals.
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(αR,βR). Since in our concept of intra-party voting equilibrium we maintain the
latter parameters fixed, and in order to deal with the higher dimensionality of our
concept of equilibrium, we study whether the nine pairs of policies that constitute
the support of an intra-party voting Nash equilibrium, for given values of (αL,βL)
and (αR,βR), are necessarily party-unanimity Nash equilibria of the game with the
same fundamentals.16 By means of an example, we show that this is not the case.
For the sake of completeness in our comparisons, we compute in Appendix B.4,
all the basic Nash equilibria, P.U.N.E and the Nash bargaining equilibria for the
particular game we consider. Next, we compute the intra-party unanimous voting
equilibria and prove the following proposition.
P 13. There exist games in which the support of intra-party unanimous
voting Nash equilibria is not a subset of the set of P.U.N.E.
2.5.1. Fundamentals
Suppose that the policy space is A = [0, 1]. The ideology functions of the two parties
are
vL(a) = 1− a and vR(a) = a.
The linearity of these functions will make our computations as simple as possible,
and for the same reason we consider the following piecewise linear function to
16 But where, again, (αL,βL) and (αR,βR) play no role.
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represent the support received by party L as a function of the two platforms chosen:
pi(aL,aR) =

max {min {b(aL + aR) − C, 1},0}, if aL < aR;
1
2 , if aL = aR;
min {max {1− b(aL + aR) + C,0}, 1}, if aL > aR.
Here, the parameter b > 0 and the constant C > 0 are fixed, and we do not try
to offer a micro-foundation for the function. It is important, however, to note that
function pi satisfies all the assumptions imposed on it in §2.2.2. In particular, it obeys
that pi(a ′,a ′′) = 1−pi(a ′′,a ′), which gives us an easy formula for the computation of
the support for party R. This latter assumption, however, does not impose symmetry
for the inter-party game: it does not imply, for example, that pi(0, 1) = 1/2.
In our computations, in Appendix B.4, we assume, furthermore, that 1/2 < b 6
3/2, C < 1 and 2b−2 6 C < 2b−1. Figure 2.1 shows the area of parameters allowed
by these conditions. These assumptions simply help us to solve some ambiguities in
our computations. The game is symmetric between parties when C = b − 1/2; later
on, the particular case when b = 1 and C = 1/2, will be considered. For arbitrary
values of b and C, we can illustrate the levels of the support function pi as in Figure
2.2.
Since the values of (αL,βL), (αR,βR), δL and δR are not needed for all the
computations, we do not yet give values for these parameters.
In the next section, we compute intra-party unanimous voting Nash equilib-
rium for the simplified version of the game, and prove the Proposition 13.
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Figure 2.1: Valid values for parameters b and C (the area shadowed in red).
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Figure 2.2: The levels of function pi.
2.5.2. Intra-party voting Nash Equilibria
Since this task is mathematically much more complicated than the computation of
the equilibria we have found so far, we need to appeal to numerical methods and,
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thus, need to impose specific values to the parameters under consideration. For
similar reasons, we simplify the game further by imposing parametric values that
make it symmetric between the two parties.17 Also, in order to make the require-
ments of our concept of equilibrium as close as possible as Roemer’s motivation for
the concept of party-unanimity Nash equilibrium, we will concentrate on intra-party
voting Nash equilibrium that require unanimity for both parties.
Specifically, the game that we are going to consider will have b = 1, C = 1/2,
δL = δR, 0 < αL = αR, 0 < βL = βR, 1 − αL − βL < 1 and γL = γR = 1. The first two
conditions suffice to make the sets of party-unanimity Nash equilibria and of Nash
bargaining solutions symmetric. Using our results from Appendix E, we present
the set of Roemer equilbria in Figure 2.3. The other assumptions, which are of no
relevance for Roemer equilibria, will allow us to search for symmetric intra-party
voting Nash equilibria, where aL,t = 1−aR,t for each of the three types, t ∈ {m,o,p}.
Consistency of Roemer equilibria and intra-party voting Nash equilibria
As mentioned earlier, a Roemer equilibrium is a pair of policies in (aL,aR) ∈ A×A,
while an intra-party voting Nash equilibrium is a pair of policy profiles (~aL, ~aR) ∈
A3 × A3; therefore, we need to specify a sense in which these two objects can be
compared. At the same time, the fact that we have a whole set of Roemer equilibria,
which does not depend on the parameters of the intra-party voting problem (namely
δi, αi, βi and γi), allows us to establish the following criterion: given a pair
17 By this, we mean that the functions and optimization problems of the Right party are the
rotation of those of the Left party, in the sense that vR(a) = vL(1− a) and pi(a,a ′) = 1− pi(a ′,a).
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Figure 2.3: The set of Roemer equilibria of the simple game, with b = 1 and C = 1/2 is
the shaded area. It only includes its boundaries where these are drawn in a continuous
line, and it contains, in particular, the five dots (of these dots, (0, 1) is the Nash equilibrium
between militants, ( 14 ,
3
4) is the Nash equilibrium between pragmatists, and (
1
2 ,
1
2) is the
Nash equilibrium between opportunists).
(~aL, ~aR) ∈ A3 ×A3, define the support of this pair as the set
{aL,m,aL,o,aL,p}× {aR,m,aR,o,aR,p};
then, we would say that intra-party voting Nash equilibrium is consistent with
Roemer equilibrium if for any value of the parameters δi, αi, βi and γi, for
i = L,R, a pair of policy profiles (~aL, ~aR) is a intra-party voting Nash equilibrium
and pair (aL,aR) lies in the support of this equilibrium, then (aL,aR) is a Roemer
equilibrium.
Intuitively, consistency would require that at every intra-party voting Nash equi-
librium, in each party each faction proposes a policy that is Pareto efficient from the
point of view of its own party, given each of the three policies that are chosen by
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the factions of the other party. This definition is demanding, since in our definition
of equilibrium each faction chooses a policy under uncertainty about the policy
that the opposing party will play, for it does not know which one of that party’s
faction will win its intra-party game – this is an ex-ante choice, while, under this
uncertainty, the concept of consistency would require ex-post efficiency of all the
choices. Our main point in this paper is precisely that: we are going to argue that
intra-party voting Nash equilibrium is not consistent with Roemer equilibrium. This
means that in a situation in which the primary intra-party contests are important,
the concept of Roemer equilibrium is misleading, for it requires ex-post efficiency
of a series of choices that in reality are made ex-ante. We will later prove that,
indeed, this divergence of criteria is the reason for the inconsistency we claim.
Computation of intra-party voting Nash equilibrium
In order to compute intra-party voting Nash equilibria, we apply the following
numerical algorithm, given particular values of the parameters δL = δR, 0 < αL = αR,
0 < βL = βR, 1 − αL − βL < 1 and γL = γR = 1. In the algorithm G[0, 1] represents a
discretization of the interval [0, 1] containing 1,000 points.
1. Fix a strategy ~aR = (aR,m,aR,o,aR,p) for party R.
2. Define strategy ~aL = (1− aR,m, 1− aR,o, 1− aR,p) for party R.
3. For every a ∈ G[0, 1], compute the values of functions
vL(a),pi(a,aR,m),pi(a,aR,o),pi(a,aR,p),µL(a,aR,m),µL(a,aR,o) and µL(a,aR,p).
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4. For every a ∈ G[0, 1], compute the expected value functions
VL(a),ΠL(a, ~aR) and ML(a, ~aR).
5. For every a ∈ G[0, 1], compute the discounted continuation values of the other
types:
(a) for militants
δLΠ
e
L[(a,aL,o,aL,p), ~aR] and δLMeL[(a,aL,o,aL,p), ~aR].
(b) for opportunists
δLV
e
L [(aL,m,a,aL,p)] and δLMeL[(aL,m,a,aL,p), ~aR].
(c) for pragmatists
δLV
e
L [(aL,m,aL,o,a)] and δLΠeL[(aL,m,aL,o,a), ~aR].
6. For every a ∈ G[0, 1], determine if it passes:
(a) for militants, a passes if
ΠL(a, ~aR) > δLΠeL[(a,aL,o,aL,p), ~aR] and ML(a, ~aR) > δLMeL[(a,aL,o,aL,p), ~aR].
(b) for opportunists, a passes if
VL(a) > δLVeL [(aL,m,a,aL,p)] and ML(a, ~aR) > δLMeL[(aL,m,a,aL,p), ~aR].
(c) for pragmatists, a passes if
VL(a) > δLVeL [(aL,m,aL,o,a)] and ΠL(a, ~aR) > δLΠeL[(aL,m,aL,o,a), ~aR].
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7. Determine optimal policies for each faction:
(a) for militants, find a^m that makes v(a) maximum amongst all those that
pass.
(b) for opportunists, find a^o that makes ΠL(a, ~aR) maximum amongst all those
that pass.
(c) for pragmatists, find a^p that makesML(a, ~aR) maximum amongst all those
that pass.
8. If
a^m = aL,m, a^o = aL,o and a^p = aL,p,
stop. Else, perturb strategy ~aR = (aR,m,aR,o,aR,p) and iterate to 2.
From the output of the algorithm, we get a symmetric intra-party voting Nash
equilibrium (~aL, ~aR).
Inefficiency of intra-party voting Nash equilibrium
In addition to the values of b = 1 and C = 1/2, consider the game with the
following values for the exogenous parameters: δL = δR = 0.55, αL = αR = 0.01
and βL = βR = 0.98. After running the first seven steps of the algorithm above,
for ~aR = (aR,m,aR,o,aR,p) = (0.974,0.412,0.75), we construct the three figures in
Appendix C 18.
18 Which correspond to the Graphs of Pragmatists, Militants and Opportunists, respcetively
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For militants: Consider the second figure in Appendix C. The straight, down-
ward sloping line is the objective function of the militants of the Left, VL(a) (which
is measured on the axis to the right). The other two functions are the difference
between the immediate expected payoff and the discounted continuation value for
the other two factions of the party: the smoother curve measures
ML(a, ~aR) − δLMeL[(a,aL,o,aL,p), ~aR],
while the more irregular, piecewise linear function represents
ΠL(a, ~aR) − δLΠeL[(a,aL,o,aL,p), ~aR].
The former curve is above 0 for values of a between 0 and 0.727, but the latter is
below 0 for values of a below 0.026 and above 0.75, which means that, the Left’s
pragmatists would vote to support policies 0 6 a 6 0.727 proposed by the party’s
militants, while its opportunists would only support policies 0.026 6 a 6 0.75. Of
these «feasible» values, the one that maximizes VL is a^m = 0.026.
For Opportunists: Consider now third figure in Appendix C. The straight line
measures
VL(a) − δLV
e
L [(aL,m,a,aL,p)],
while the smoother curve measures
ML(a, ~aR) − δLMeL[(aL,m,a,aL,p), ~aR].
The militants would vote to support any policy where the former line is above 0,
while the pragmatists would vote to support policies where the latter curve takes
positive values. Under unanimity, the only policies that pass are those where both
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of these conditions hold, which are any a 6 0.588. The Left’s opportunists will try
to maximize ΠL(a, ~aR), which is the piecewise linear function, subject to a 6 0.588.
Maximization, thus, occurs precisely at the corner a^o 6 0.588.
For Pragmatists: Finally, consider the first figure in Appendix C. The straight
line measures
VL(a) − δLV
e
L [(aL,m,aL,o,a)],
while the piecewise linear function, which is measured in the right axis, depicts
ΠL(a, ~aR) − δLΠeL[(aL,m,aL,o,a), ~aR].
Again, for the pragmatists to obtain the support of the other two factions, these
two functions must take non-negative values, which occurs for a 6 0.761. The
pragmatists seek to maximize ML(a, ~aR), namely the smooth function, over that
subset of policies, so their optimal policy is a^p = 0.25.
Equilibrium: The computations above give us a profile of policies where each
faction in the Left party is maximizing its expected value, given the policies chosen
by the other two factions of the same party, and by the three factions of the Right.
That is, vector ~a = (0.026,0.588,0.25) gives an equilibrium of the intra-party game
for the Left. For us to obtain an intra-party voting Nash equilibrium, we would
need to further argue that the three factions of the Right are also maximizing their
expected values, given the policies chosen by the other factions of the Right, and
by the three factions of the Left. By symmetry, however, it suffices to observe that
~a = 1− ~aR, to conclude that this is indeed the case, and, hence that
(~aL, ~aR) = [(0.026,0.588,0.25), (0.974,0.412,0.75)]
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is an intra-party voting Nash equilibrium. This means that along the policy space
A = [0, 1] the left party will announce three different platforms, depending on which
faction wins the internal elections. If the militants, opportunist or pragmatist win
the internal elections, then they will place themselves in the position 0.026, 0.588
or 0.25 along the policy space. The same can be said for the right party.
Inefficiency of equilibrium policies: Now that we have computed the intra-
party unanimous Nash equilibria, what remains to prove proposition 13 is to show
that the support of the entire intra-party equilibria is not in the set of Roemer
equilibria. Figure 2.4 depicts the support of our equilibria and compares it with
the set of P.U.N.E. The main finding of this exercise is that there are points in
the support that do not constitute a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium. There are
three such pairs: (aL,m,aR,o), (aL,o,aR,m) and (aL,o,aR,o). The pairs (aL,m,aR,o) and
(aL,o,aR,m) fail to be Roemer equilibrium for the same reason: in both cases, the
militants of a party are picking a policy that is so «extreme» in terms of that party’s
ideology, that when such policy is confronted with the opposing party’s opportunists,
which are in turn taking a policy quite far from their ideological extremes, the first
party fails the intra-party efficiency condition required by Roemer. Indeed, in both
cases the party of the militants has zero probability of winning, yet it is not adopting
the ideal policy for its militants. The reason why the militants adopted this position
was that, ex-ante,19 their parties’ opportunists would not have supported an even
more extreme platform.
The last pair of policies, (aL,o,aR,o), also fails to be a Roemer equilibrium, but
19 That is, before knowing which of the opposing party’s factions they were going to face.
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Figure 2.4: The nine thick dots constitute the support of the equilibrium pair of policies.
The shaded area is the set of party-unanimity Nash equilibria.
for a different, and perhaps more interesting reason. In this case, both parties’
opportunists would be competing in the election, and the Right party would have
adopted a more «leftist» platform than the Left party. This is not internally efficient
for any of the parties: given the policy chosen by the opposition, all the factions of
a given party would have been better off had they chosen a policy closer to the one
of the opposition. In this case, the militants and pragmatists of each party would
have supported one such change in policy if it had been proposed by their fellow
opportunists, but it was not in the latter’s interest to do so: given the probability
that the opposition would adopt the policy proposed by its pragmatists, ex-ante the
opportunists choose the most extreme policy that their fellow militants are willing
to support.
In the three points we have mentioned, the interpretation of an observed pair
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of policies as a Roemer equilibrium would be quite misleading. In the first two
pairs, the analyst would need to mis-specify the voters preferences to account for
them. In the latter, the analyst would have to mis-specify the parties’ ideology
functions. These errors would arise from the utilization of a concept in which
the intra-party contest plays little strategic role: by imposing intra-party efficiency,
Roemer’s concept is, a fortiori dismissing all the externalities that a party’s factions
impose on each other during primary elections. The point of our next section is to
argue that, indeed, the reason why intra-party voting Nash equilibria may fail to
display the properties required by Roemer’s party-unanimity Nash equilibrium lies
mainly on the fact that each party’s factions are choosing under uncertainty about
the policy that the other party will propose. This uncertainty is due to the lack
of knowledge of its party members about which of its factions will prevail in its
internal contest.
.. I-   -  N

In order to argue that it is due to the inherent uncertainty that each party faces
about the outcome in its opposition’s primary vote, we will now consider the ficti-
tious situation in which the three factions of a party (the Left) have to solve the
intra-party contest under the assumption that the opposing party’s policy is given.
P 14. Fix a policy aR ∈ [0, 1], and suppose that the three factions of the
Right are going to follow that policy: ~aR = (aR,aR,aR). Let ~aL be such that Conditions
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(2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) are satisfied, with γL = 1. Then, the three factions of the Left
choose policies to the left of aR:
aL,m 6 aR, aL,o 6 aR and aL,p 6 aR.
Proof: Each of the three inequalities can be argued separately. The most interesting
case, though, is the second inequality, for it is apparent that if the opportunists are
to the left of aR, then so will the other two factions of the Left.
To argue this inequality, suppose, by way of contradiction, that aL,o > aR. By
assumption, vL(aR) > vL(aL,o), which suffices to imply that VL(aR) > VL(aL,o), and
hence that
VL(aR) > δLV
e
L(aL,m,aR,aL,p).
For the same reason, µL(aR,aR) > µL(aL,o,aR), which implies that ML(aR, ~aR) >
ML(aL,o, ~aR), and therefore that
ML(aR, ~aR) > δLMeL[(aL,m,aR,aL,p), ~aR],
since δL < 1 and βL 6 1. The latter implies that both the militants and the prag-
matists of the Left would vote to support aR if it were proposed by their fellow
opportunists, so that such policy would pass, even when γL = 1. By continuity, if
the opportunists proposed a = aR + ε, for ε > 0 small enough, such policy would
also pass, but this is impossible because, in such case, ΠL(a, ~aR) > Π(aL,o, ~aR), which
contradicts Condition (2.6). Q.E.D.
This proposition addresses the point we posed at the end of the previous section,
that is, in the absence of uncertainty about the rival’s policy, the strong intra-party
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inefficiency displayed by the policy pair (aL,o,aR,o) in our previous example would not
occur. An analogous result holds for the type of intra-party inefficiency exhibited by
the other two pairs, but in a weaker sense: if the solution to an intra-party contest
displays such inefficiency in the absence of uncertainty about the policy proposed
by the opposing party, then there is a policy triple that also solves the intra-party
contest and is, at least, weakly Pareto superior.
P 15. Fix a policy aR ∈ [0, 1], and suppose that the three factions of the
Right are going to follow that policy: ~aR = (aR,aR,aR). Let ~aL be such that Conditions
(2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) are satisfied, with γL = 1. Then,
1. if pi(aL,m,aR) = 0, then aL,m = 0;
2. if pi(aL,o,aR) = 0, then a = 0 passes and ΠL(aL,o, ~aR) = ΠL(0, ~aR); and
3. if pi(aL,p,aR) = 0, then a = 0 passes and ML(aL,o, ~aR) =ML(0, ~aR).
Proof: Again, the three results can be proved independently, but the most interesting
is the second one. To see that the second claim is true, suppose that pi(aL,o,aR) = 0.
Since ~aL satisfies Condition (2.6), it must be true that the Left’s pragmatis vote to
accept aL,o. Since aL,o > 0, it must be true that
0 6 pi(0,aR) 6 pi(aL,o,aR) = 0,
which suffices to imply that ML(0, ~aR) = ML(aL,o, ~aR). The latter implies that the
pragmatists also vote to accept a = 0 when proposed by the opportunists. By
definition of function vL, so do the militants, which implies that a = 0 passes. To
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see that ΠL(aL,o, ~aR) = ΠL(0, ~aR), observe, again, that pi(0,aR) = pi(aL,o,aR), which
suffices for the result. Q.E.D.
.. C
We present a two-party model of electoral competition in which each party must
elect a type of politician that will subsequently compete with the elected member of
the opposing party.
We use Baron and Ferejohn’s bargaining protocol to explicitly model the decision
process by which each party elects a type of political actor, and offer an alterna-
tive solution concept, intra-party unanimity Nash equilibria for games of electoral
competition.
We design an example to show that not all the policy pairs in the support of an
intra-party Nash equilibrium are necessarily Roemer equilibria and prove the intra-
party inefficiency captured by a triplet of policy pairs occurs due to the uncertainty
each party has about the policy the contender will propose.
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Essay three
A Bargaining Model with Strategic
Generosity.
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.. I
A question in economics which, not seldom, has been investigated is how people
negotiate over how to divide a dollar and what will the agreed partition be. The
two fundamental approaches within the literature have been the axiomatic and the
strategic approach. While the former, associated with Nash (1950), attempts to
design a set of axioms that a "fair" and "reasonable" division should satisfy, and
identify the division with these properties; the latter, associated with Rubinstein
(1982), provides both an explicit description of an entire bargaining situation and a
precise notion of the players’ rationality which yield a solution concept. Although,
numerous studies within the latter approach embrace salient features such as, tim-
ing of the offers (i.e. how frequent offers may be)1 and the institutional structure (i.e.
sequence of moves)2, not much has been explored for the case where agents’ pref-
erences, within a specific bargaining environment, are represented by heterogenous
utility functions.
Suppose individuals in a bargaining game negotiate over how to divide a fixed
amount of money, say a dollar. Their preferences are represented by different utility
functions, namely, they represent selfish and egalitarian individuals preferences.
The first type of player derives utility solely from the shares they can obtain for
themselves, whereas the second type derives utility, both from his individual shares
and those allocated to the remaining players. The objective of this paper is to
propose a model of endogenous formation of strategic generosity. Furthermore, in
1 See Sákovics (1993), Perry and Reny (1993) and Admati and Perry (1987)
2 See Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Sutton (1986)
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absence of any bargaining protocol all two types will stay with the entire dollar for
themselves, regardless of the other regarding preferences of the egalitarian player.
Nonetheless, the presence of a negotiation protocol à la Rubinstein allows strategic
generosity to endogenously emerge. The basic setup analyzed in this paper explicitly
describes the procedure by which the proposer, when having to decide how much
of the dollar to offer the seconder in order for the latter to accept, strategically
considers (in accordance with his preferences) the consequences of changes in the
distribution of types on his payoffs. Similarly, we describe the procedure by which
the seconder, when deciding either to accept or reject an offer, strategically considers
the consequences of variations in the profile of types.
Essentially, we concentrate on the role played by the heterogeneity of players
preferences and changes in the profile of types on the endogenous formation of
strategic generosity. To keep the analysis tractable, we follow Rubinstein (1982) in
that we exogenously specify a fixed time between offers, one offer per time unit, but
rather than depending upon offers made sequentially, the order by which players
are selected to make a proposal is random. We allow for players preferences to be
represented by different utility functions and derive the set of subgame perfect equi-
librium for different arrangements of player types and show that strategic generosity
comes into scene endogenously under the chosen negotiation protocol.
Related Literature: We face a bargaining problem when multiple parties have
before them several possible contractual agreements that offer, if they coordinate
their actions, an opportunity to gain but their interests are not entirely identical.
Over a century ago, Edgeworth (1881) considered negotiation between individuals to
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be the most fundamental problem in economics. Since then, studying the problem
from a non-cooperative approach requires both an explicit description of the entire
bargaining situation, as well as a precise notion of the players’ rationality. This is
commonly known as the strategic approach to the bargaining problem. Assuming
parties behave rationally, the question this situation poses is what will the agreed
contract be?
Nash (1950 and 1953) was one of the first to study a class of two-person bar-
gaining situations. He offered two independent derivations of the solution to the
problem. The first is a set of several properties that determine the solution uniquely.
The second was an effort to complement the axiomatic approach where he reduced
the cooperative game to a non-cooperative game and proved that the solution is
the limit of a sequence of equilibria of smoothed games. It was Nash himself who
expressed that ...."the two approaches to the problem, via the negotiation model or
via the axioms, are complementary; each helps to justify and clarify".3
Occasionally, the strategic approach has been criticized on the grounds that the
predictions of the model are highly dependent and sensitive to the exact description
of the extensive form. Aumann (1987) shared this same concern when expressing
the reasons why cooperative games came to be treated separately: ....."when one
3 He also claims that the situation to be treated is more general than that in the bargaining
problem mentioned above since the solution is characterized by the maximization of the Nash
product, that is the differences between the values of the game and their default utilities (i.e. utility
levels that players can obtain if they break up negotiations: if they don’t cooperate). As shown if
Nash (1953).
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does build negotiation and enforcement procedures explicitly into the model, then
the results of a non-cooperative analysis depend very strongly on the precise form
of the procedures, on the order of making offers and counter-offers, and so on. This
may be appropriate in voting situations in which precise rules of parliamentary
order prevail...... But problems of negotiation are usually more amorphous; it is
difficult to pin down just what the procedures are. More fundamentally, there is a
feeling that procedures are not really all that relevant; that it is the possibilities for
coalition forming, promising and threatening that are decisive, rather than whose
turn it is to speak. Another reason is that even when the procedures are specified,
non- cooperative analyses of a cooperative game often lead to highly non-unique
results, so that they are often quite inconclusive."4
Although Rubinstein (1982) too recognized that the main difficulty with the
strategic approach has been the need to specify the moves of the game, specially
when not all bargaining situations have a unique procedure. Rubinstein’s (1982)
bargaining game is an example of the sensitivity to the exact description the exten-
sive forms, as it turn out it is the order and timing of the offers the main force
driving the predictions of the model. Nonetheless, he also expressed some reserva-
tions concerning the axiomatic approach stressing that.... (1) some of the axioms
are not easily defended in abstract and that ....(2) additional information, such as
the negotiation time preferences, seems to be relevant to the solution".5 Our model
4 This chapter originally appeared in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 2,
edited by J.Eatwell, M. Miligate and P. Newman, pp. 460-482. Macmillan London (1987). Reprinted
with permission.
5 See Rubinstein (1985)
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is a strategic model, and as such it embodies a detailed description of a special
procedure which we will specify in detail further into the paper.
This paper is organized as follows. We develop the basic framework and define
the concept of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the next section. In section 3.3
we solve the game, present and analyze our results. My concluding remarks and
some directions for further research appear in section 3.4.
.. T B M
3.2.1. The protocol
Let the set of players be N = {1, 2, 3}. At each stage of the game only one randomly
chosen player can make an offer. For the game to end, that is, for players to reach
an agreement, the offer must be accepted by the majority of players. There are no
bounds on the number of rounds of negotiation. In the event that an agreement
isn’t reached, places no restriction on the offers subsequently made, for example,
there are no rules binding players to any previous offers they have made. The
continuation game does not depend on the actions of the players in the current
period. Last, we don’t assume players are impatient about enjoying the fruits of an
agreement, in other words, they do not face costly time lapses between bargaining
rounds. So, three players have the opportunity to reach agreement on how to divide
a dollar and to do so a player is randomly selected, with probability 1/3, to propose
an allocation from the (compact and convex) set of all feasible divisions of a dollar,
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X = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3+ |
3∑
i=1
xi = 1}
Once a proposal has been made, the remaining two players vote whether to
accept or reject it. For an agreement to be reached we have determined the voting
rule to be that of the majority: understanding that the player who makes a proposal
supports it, if one of the remaining players votes to accept it, an agreement has
been reached.
If the players reach an agreement, they immediately receive the allocation and
the game ends. If they do not agree, a new player is randomly selected (with
replacement) to propose, and the game continues as before. In the case that players
never agree on an allocation of the dollar, the outcome is the disagreement event
and the payoff for each individual is zero.
3.2.2. Individual preferences
We allow for the players’ utility functions to depend, not solely, on their indi-
vidual payments, but we consider agents who also value the overall allocation of
the dollar. In this sense, players also take into account the social allocation of
the aggregate resource so that their utility functions mirror selfish and Rawlsian
principles. Hence, player i is selfish if her utility function is
ui(x) = xi;
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and she is Rawlsian if it is
ui(x) = xi + βmin
j,k 6=i
{xj, xk},
again for some β ∈ (0, 1). Across rounds of negotiation, individuals do not discount
their payoffs.
Rawlsian type players are “altruistic", in the sense that they derive utility from
the income that is allocated to others. We will assume that β < 1 and it this sense
ensure that, by itself, altruism does not induce “generosity". For instance, if a player
can simply impose the allocation of the dollar without negotiation then regardless
of their type, both will choose the “selfish" allocation; which means that each type
will choose to stay with the entire dollar for themselves. But once types abide to
a negotiation protocol we ask ourselves whether players respond strategically by
sharing less to generously sharing much more. Can "strategic generosity" emerge
as a result of the bargaining process?
We will solve the game considering different arrangements of types: (i) three
players of the same type, for each of the types; (ii) two selfish and one Rawlsian
player; and (iii) two Rawlsian and one selfish player.
3.2.3. Actions, pure strategies and pure-ish strategies
We refer to a player’s actions according to his standpoint. In other words, what
player i can offer, when he’s been randomly selected, is xi = (1 − xi,j − xi,k, xi,j, xi,k)
where xi,j and xi,k correspond to the shares players j and k receive from player i.
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In addition, when a player (different from i) has made an offer to i, the latter’s
response will be: di ∈ {A,R}, where A and R denote whether i accepts, or rejects the
offer, respectively.
In this order of ideas, a pure strategy for player i must specify the following: for
each period t, after each possible history of actions observed up to round t − 1, an
offer xit that she makes -if selected to propose-; and for each t, after each possible
history of actions observed up to round t− 1, and for each possible proposal xjt that
that player j can make with j 6= i„ a decision dit that i enunciates.
If we are to consider mixed strategies, then we must specify, under the same
contingencies, a probability distribution Pi,t over set X, and another over the set
{A,R}. The former would determine the proposal xi,t, the latter the decision di,t.
Since the game is stationary, we will concentrate our attention on equilibria
where strategies are stationary too. Therefore, the actions of each player at round
t will be independent of the history of actions up to round t− 1. So, at equilibrium
we can denote the strategies by dropping the subindex t.
Whenever possible, we will look for equilibrium in pure strategies, but this
type of equilibrium does not always exist. If the game has no equilibrium in pure
strategies, we will consider a simple case of mixed strategies, that we may call “pure-
ish": we will not allow players to randomize on their decisions whether to accept
or reject a proposal, and we will only allow the proposer to randomize between two
points in X. That is, in our equilibrium strategies:
1. When player i is chosen to propose, she chooses two points xi,j, xi,k ∈ X and
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two probabilities pi,j and pi,k such that pi,j + pi,k = 1 ∀j and k 6= i and j 6= k;
player i will propose xi,j with probability pi,j, and xi,k with probability pi,k.
2. When player i isn’t selected to propose, her decision to accept or reject is
determined by the following rule: for some number vi, player i will accept a
proposal xj,i if, and only if, ui(xj,i) > vi for j 6= i, regardless of who makes
the proposal. Moreover, the utility level v will have to be the utility level that
player i obtains in the game, at equilibrium.
The first condition simply seeks to keep the strategies as “pure” as possible,
while at the same time it gives the players space for randomization. The property
is appealing, under the following interpretation: when player i has been chosen to
propose, she only needs to get the approval of one of the other two players; she
will try to get the approval of player j with probability pi,j, and that of player k
with probability pi,k. The second property seeks to dismiss trivial majority equilibria
where the players that have not been chosen to propose, approve any proposal just
because that is what the other player is doing.
3.2.4. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
Denote the one-dimensional unit simplex by ∆. Under the provisions above, a
stationary, pure-ish strategy for player i can be written as a pair (fi, vi), where
fi = ((pi,j,pi,k), xi,j, xi,k) ∈ ∆× X× X
and vi ∈ [0, 1].
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D 1. A stationary, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure-ish strategies
will be an array
((f1, v1), (f2, v2), (f3, v3))
such that, for each player i, the following conditions hold true:
pi,j > 0 implies that xi,j ∈ argmaxxi{ui(xi) : uj(xi) > vj}, (3.1)
pi,j > 0 implies that ui(xi,j) > max
xi
{ui(xi) : uk(xi) > vk}, (3.2)
∀j 6= i and
vi =
1
3
[
3∑
j=1
∑
k 6=j
pj,kui(xj,k)]. (3.3)
Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) state that player i is rational at the time of making offers,
for it requires that: (i) when trying to get the support of player j, she does it by
choosing, among the proposals that j would accept, the one that is most convenient
for herself; and (ii) if she is going to try to convince player j, it must be that she
cannot be better off by convincing player k 6= j. Eq. (3.3) states that player i is
rational when deciding whether to accept or reject an offer.
Moreover, we will only look at symmetric equilibria, where two players of the
same type follow the same strategy.
.. B E
Let us first consider the case where all three players are selfish. An array ((f1, v1), (f2, v2), (f3, v3))
is subgame perfect if it satisfies Eqs. (3.1) to (3.3), that is,
x13 >
1
3
[x13 + (1− x21 )],
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x21 >
1
3
[x21 + (1− x32)],
and
x32 >
1
3
[x32 + (1− x13)]
correspondingly. Since the game is stationary and symmetric: x21 = x32 = x13. By
solving the system of inequalities we get that, at any stage of the game, when it’s
player 1 ′s turn to propose she will offer player 2, x1,2 = ( 23 ,
1
3 ,0) with probability
p1,2 = 1 and player 2 will accept. Under the conditions above Player 1 ′s degenerate
pure-ish stationary strategy can be written as, (1,0, ( 23 ,
1
3 ,0),
1
3)
Because the game is stationary and symmetric: without loss of generality, if
instead of player 1 being randomly selected to propose, it is player 2, who choses
player 3 to bargain with in order to reach an reach agreement, and if instead of
player 2 being the proposer, it is player 3 who chooses among the proposals player
1 will accept to reach agreement, the stationary subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies will be,
For player 1.
((1,0), (2
3
, 1
3
,0), 1
3
),
For player 2.
((1,0), (0, 2
3
, 1
3
), 1
3
),
For player 3.
((1,0), ( 1
3
,0, 2
3
), 1
3
).
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D 2. A selfish offer (I) from player i is an offer such that, xi,j = 13 , xi,k =
0 and (1− xi,j) = 23 .
P 16. Whenever all three players present in the game are selfish, regardless
of whose turn it is to make a proposal, all of them make selfish offers (I).
Proof:
Let’s consider the case where all three players are selfish. Say player 2 accepts
a proposal, from 1, x∗1,2 = ( 23 + ,
1
3 − ,0). Accepting the offer, by Eqs. (3.3), implies
she is behaving rationally, but u2(x∗1 ) < v2 which cannot be.6 On the other hand,
because player 1 requires the support of only one player for the game to end, say she
tries to convince player 2 to accept a proposal for the game to reach agreement such
that x∗∗1,2 = ( 23 − ,
1
3 + ,0). Player 1 must have have chosen, among the proposals
that 2 will accept, the one that maximizes her utility. So, by not choosing among the
proposals that player 3 would have accepted, implies player 1 cannot increase her
utility beyond the level she will achieve when proposing x∗∗1,2. However, by symmetry,
player 1 can convince player 3 of accepting proposal, x1,3 = ( 23 ,0,
1
3). Therefore, by
choosing among the proposals player 2 accepts, player 1 isn’t maximizing her utility,
since, u1(x∗∗1,2) < u1(x1,3). She could be better off if she gains support from 3 by
offering, x1,3.7 Q.E.D.
6 Refer to Figure 4, (case 1) of Appendix C.2 where we have plotted a selfish players expected
utility, for different levels of β. In this case player 2 ′s continuation payoff equals 13 which is below
her cut-off point, therefore she will not accept.
7 See Appendix C.2, Figure 4 (case 1) to see that player 3 ′s continuation payoff equals her utility
payoff of player 1 ′s proposal, therefore 3 will indeed accept 1 ′s offer.
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Now, let’s consider the case where players 1 and 2, are selfish and 3 is Rawlsian.
Since this arrangement has no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies,
to look for the stationary equilibrium in mixed strategies8 Eqs. (3.1) to (3.3) must
be satisfied. To find the stationary pure-ish strategy for player i, it must be that she
is indifferent between making a proposal to player j and k, for all i, jandk ∈ {1, 2, 3}
rand all i 6= j 6= k. In which case, u1(x1,2) = u1(x1,3), u2(x2,1) = u2(x2,3) and
u3(x3,1) = u3(x3,2) which implies, :x12 = x32 and x21 = x31 . Thus, by symmetry, x12 = x21 ,
x31 = x
3
2, p1,2 = p2,1, consequently,
x1j >
2
7− 2p1,2
,
for j = (2, 3)
x2j >
2
7− 2p2,1
for j = (1, 3) and
x3i >
1
2+ 2pi,j − 2pi,jβ
for i and j = (1, 2).
By solving the system of inequalities: player 1 offers: x1,2 = (6−5β9−7β ,
3−2β
9−7β ,0) and
x1,3 = (
6−5β
9−7β ,0,
3−2β
9−7β ) with probability p1,2 =
3
6−4β and p1,3 =
3−4β
6−4β , respectively. By
symmetry, x2,1 = (3−2β9−7β ,
6−5β
9−7β ,0) with p2,1 =
3
6−4β and (ii) x2,3 = (0,
6−5β
9−7β ,
3−2β
9−7β ) with
probability p2,3 = 3−4β6−4β .
8 To see why there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies, refer to Appendix C.2.
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Whenever it’s a selfish type’s turn to offer, if β > 34 he places a offer to her same
type only, hence, p1,2 = p2,1 = 1. By symmetry, same for player 2, thus among the
offers 1 accepts, the latter accepts the one that maximises her utility. To convince 1
of accepting, it must be that 2 cannot be better off by making an offer to player 3.
When β is high making a proposal to a Rawlsian type that the latter will accept is
too costly compared to what it costs to convince a player of his same type. Since
the Rawlsians’ continuation payoff is greater than the selfish type’s, the latter type
will solely propose to his same type.9
Now, if β < 34 , by symmetry: p1,2 = p2,1 then
1
2 6 p1,2 6 1. In line with what
has been said above, as β increases the probability that a selfish player makes an
offer to his same type increases. In essence, a greater (lower) β translates into a
greater (lower) expected utility for the Rawlsian player, discouraging (encouraging),
say player 2 to make a proposal to player 3.
Last, when player 3 makes an offer, she flips a fair coin and offers: x3,1 =
(3−2β9−7β ,0,
6−5β
9−7β ) and x3,2 = (0,
3−2β
9−7β ,
6−5β
9−7β ). Furthermore, irrespective of the value of
β ∈ (0, 1) he turns out making the same offer the selfish type does.
The stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure-ish strategies will be,
For player 1.
((
3
6− 4β
, 3− 4β
6− 4β
), (6− 5β
9− 7β
, 3− 2β
9− 7β
,0), (6− 5β
9− 7β
,0, 3− 2β
9− 7β
))
3− 2β
9− 7β
),
if β < 34 .
9 See Appendix C.2 and compare cases 4 and 1 of Figure 4 and 6.
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((1,0), (6− 5β
9− 7β
, 3− 2β
9− 7β
,0), (6− 5β
9− 7β
,0, 3− 2β
9− 7β
))
3− 2β
9− 7β
),
if β > 34
For player 2.
((
3
6− 4β
, 3− 4β
6− 4β
), (3− 2β
9− 7β
, 6− 5β
9− 7β
,0), ((0, 6− 5β
9− 7β
, 3− 2β
9− 7β
), 3− 2β
9− 7β
),
if β < 34 .
((1,0), (3− 2β
9− 7β
, 6− 5β
9− 7β
,0), ((0, 6− 5β
9− 7β
, 3− 2β
9− 7β
), 3− 2β
9− 7β
),
if β > 34 .
For player 3.
((
1
2
, 1
2
), (3− 2β
9− 7β
,0, 6− 5β
9− 7β
), (0, 3− 2β
9− 7β
, 6− 5β
9− 7β
), 3− 2β
9− 7β
)
D 3. A semi-selfish offer from player i is an offer such that xi,j = 3−2β9−7β , xi,k =
0 and (1− xi,j) = 6−5β9−7β .
P 17. When two out of three players present in the game are selfish,
irrespective of the value of β, all three players will make semi-selfish offers.
Proof: Provided β > 34 and since player 1 and 2 make proposals amongst each
other, if Player 2 proposes, x∗2,1 = (
3−2β
9−7β −,
6−5β
9−7β +,0) player 1
′s continuation payoff
is greater than the utility she will receive from x∗2,1, therefore, she will not accept.
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If she proposes x∗∗2,1 =
3−2β
9−7β +,
6−5β
9−7β −,0), for  > 0 she isn’t choosing the proposal
that is most convenient for her since, u2(x2,1) > u2(x∗∗2,1).
Player 2 makes a proposal, x∗∗2,3 = (0,
6−5β
9−7β −,
3−2β
9−7β +) it must be that, u2(x
∗∗
2,3) >
u(x2,3), but this cannot be since: 6−5β9−7β − <
6−5β
9−β for  > 0. Oppositely, when player
2 chooses to make a proposal to player 1 and offers, x∗∗2,1 = (
3−2β
9−7β + ,
6−5β
9−7β − ,0) she
is be better off, at any stage of the game, gaining support from player 3, in other
words, proposing, among the offers the latter accepts, x2,3 = (0, 6−5β9−7β ,
3−2β
9−7β ) since
u2(x
∗∗
2,1) < u2(x2,3).
If it’s player 3 ′s turn to propose, as β increases, it’s too costly for a Rawlsian
type to convince the other type, the best the former can do is to propose what he
accepts when the other type makes an offer to him, that is, x3i =
3−2β
9−7β ∀i = (1, 2).
In this sense, the presence of a ”altruistic" type is of no importance for the social
allocation of the aggregate resource. Q.E.D.
Let’s invert the labelling of players so that players 1 and 2 are Rawlsian and 3 is
selfish. Particularly, the game has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure-ish
strategies if,
u1(x
1
3) = u1(x
1
2) =
1
3
[u1(x
1
2) + u1(x
2
1 ) +
1
2
(u1(x
1
3) + u1(x
2
3))]
and
u2(x
2
3) = u2(x
2
1 ) =
1
3
[u2(x
2
1 ) + u2(x
1
2) +
1
2
(u2(x
2
3) + u2(x
1
3))]
By symmetry, x21 = x12, x32 = x31 and x13 = x23 and solving the system of inequalities
we get three general findings: (i) irrespective of the value of β ∈ (0, 1) a Rawlsian
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type always stays with the greatest amount of shares, (ii) for β < 12 the Rawlsian
only offer his type a positive amount of shares; conversely, if β > 12 he offers
positive amounts to both the remaining players and (iii) for β > 0.645 the selfish
player gives up the greatest amount of shares to give it to whomever she chooses
to negotiate with. Therefore, the stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure-ish strategies will be,
For player 1.
((1,0), (5− 2β− β
2
7− β2
, 2+ 2β
7− β2
,0), 2+ 2β
7− β2
),
for β 6 12 .
((1,0), (3− β
2
7− β2
, 2
7− β2
, 2
7− β2
), 2+ 2β
7− β2
),
for 12 < β < 0.645.
((1,0), ( 3+ β
2
7+ 2β+ β2
, 2+ β
7+ 2β+ β2
, 2+ β
7+ 2β+ β2
), (2+ β)(1+ β)
7+ 2β+ β2
),
for 0.645 < β 6 1.
For player 2.
((1,0), (2+ 2β
7− β2
, 5− 2β− β
2
7− β2
,0), 2+ 2β
7− β2
),
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for β 6 12 .
((1,0), ( 2
7− β2
, 3− β
2
7− β2
, 2
7− β2
), 2+ 2β
7− β2
),
for 12 < β < 0.645.
((1,0), ( 2+ β
7+ 2β+ β2
, 3+ β
2
7+ 2β+ β2
, 2+ β
7+ 2β+ β2
), (2+ β)(1+ β)
7+ 2β+ β2
),
for 0.645 < β 6 1.
For player 3.
((
1
2
, 1
2
), (2+ 2β
7− β2
,0, 5− 2β− β
2
7− β2
), (0, 2+ 2β
7− β2
, 5− 2β− β
2
7− β2
), 5− 2β− β
2
7− β2
),
for β 6 0.645
((
1
2
, 1
2
), ((2+ β)(1+ β)
7+ 2β+ β2
,0, 5− β
7+ 2β+ β2
), (0, (2+ β)(1+ β)
7+ 2β+ β2
, 5− β
7+ 2β+ β2
), 5− β
7+ 2β+ β2
),
for 0.645 < β 6 1
D 4. A greedy offer from players 1 or 2 is an offer where, x1,2 = x2,1 =
2+2β
7−β2 , x1,3 = x2,3 = 0 and (1− x1,2) = (1− x2,1) =
5−2β−β2
7−β2 when β <
1
2 .
D 5. A generous offer from players 1 or 2 is an offer such that, x1,2 = x1,3 =
x2,1 = x2,3 =
2
7−β2 and (1− 2x1,2) = (1− x2,1) =
3−β2
7−β2 for
1
2 6 β < 0.645
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D 6. An even more generous proposal from players 1 or 2 is an offer where,
x1,2 = x1,3 = x2,1 = x2,3 =
2+β
7+2β+β2 and (1 − 2x1,2) = (1 − 2x2,1) =
3+β2
7+2β+β2 when
0.645 6 β < 1.
D 7. A greedy proposal from the selfish type is an offer such that, x3,j =
2+2β
7−β2 and (1 − x3,j) =
5−2β−β2
7−β2 when β <
1
2 . And x3,j =
2+2β
7−β2 and (1 − x3,j) =
5−2β−β2
7−β2 when
1
2 6 β < 0.645 for j = 1 or 2.
D 8. A one-to-one self sacrifice offer from a selfish type is an offer where,
x3,j =
(2+β)(1+β)
7+2β+β2 and (1− x3,j) =
5−β
7+2β+β2 when 0.645 6 β < 1, for j = 1 or 2.
Definitions 4 and 7 imply that whoever the proposer is, he will only make an
offer to one of the other players, but never to both. For instance, in definition 4
players 1 and 2 only make offers among themselves, whereas in definition 7, player
3 tosses a coin to choose which of the two altruistic players he will make an offer to.
Additionally, definitions 5 and 6 imply that both altruistic players choose their same
type to bargain with by offering positive, and equal, amounts to both the remaining
players. Because β is still relatively small, trying to convince a altruistic player to
accept a proposal is relatively cheap. This is why a altruistic proposer makes a less
generous offer to the remaining players, i.e, definition 5. As β increases this makes
players 1 and 2 more difficult to convince. Therefore, bargaining with an altruistic
player is more costly, thus offers are more generous, i.e, definition 6. Along this
line of thought, whenever it’s a selfish types’ turn to make an offer, he knows that
in order to convince either one of the altruistic types he will have to offer the larger
share to whomever he chooses to bargain with and stays with the smaller share of
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the dollar, which leads us to definition 8.
P 18. Suppose there are two Rawlsian players in the game, if the following
conditions hold,
β <
1
2
, (3.4a)
1
2
6 β < 0.645, (3.4b)
0.645 6 β < 1 (3.4c)
then both of them make (i) a greedy offer, (ii) a generous offer and (iii) an even more
generous offer, respectively.
Proof: If β < 12 , we know that by solving the system of inequalities so that
x3i = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, player 1 will offer player 2, x1,2 = (5−2β−β
2
7−β2 ,
2+2β
7−β2 ,0) and player
2 accepts. Oppositely, player 1 will accept, player 2 ′s offer, x2,1 = (2+2β7−β2 ,
5−2β−β2
7−β2 ,0).
If instead, player 1 proposes to player 2, x∗1,2 = (
5−2β−β2
7−β2 ,
2
7−β2 ,
2β
7−β2 ), the former will
gain β( 2β7−β2 ) and loose (1 − β)(
2β
7−β2 ). Nevertheless, if he sticks to, x1,2 player 1
will gain (1 − β)( 2β7−β2 ) and loose β(
2β
7−β2 ). In addition, player 2
′s gains and losses
cancel out, therefore, since β < 12 player 1 will always propose x1,2 and player
2 will accept. Due to symmetry when it’s player 2 ′s turn to propose, she will
also propose x2,1 and player 1 will always accept. On the other hand, if player 1
chooses to gain support from player 3 and proposes x∗1,3 = (
5−2β−β2
7−β ,0,
2+2β
7−β ), because
the latter’s minimum willingness to accept a proposal is strictly greater than the
former’s maximum willingness to make one, x∗1,3 is not among the proposals that
player 3 will accept in order for player 1 to gain support, therefore proposal, x∗1,3
cannot be.
111
When 12 6 β < 0.645, player 1 proposes, x1,2 = (
3−β2
7−β2 ,
2
7−β2 ,
2
7−β2 ) and player
2 accepts. Similarly, if it’s player 2 ′s turn to propose, he offers player 1 x2,1 =
( 27−β2 ,
3−β2
7−β2 ,
2
7−β2 ) and player 1 accepts. The only reason why player 1 would deviate
so that x21 > x31 > 0, were if 1 − x21 − x31 + βx31 > 3−β
2
7−β2 and the same goes for player
2 in the sense that, x21 + βx31 >
2+2β
7−β2 . However, if β >
1
2 the minimum player 2
is willing to receive from player 1 in order to reach an agreement conditional on
x31 = 0 is greater than the maximum player 1 is willing to offer.10. Player 1 will only
have an incentive to deviate so that x21 > x31 = 0 if β < 12 , which cannot be.
Last, when 0.645 6 β < 1, player 1 will will offer x1,2 = ( 3+β
2
7+2β+β2 ,
2+β
7+2β+β2 ,
2+β
7+2β+β2 )
to player 2 and the latter accepts. When selected to propose, player 2, offers,
x2,1 = (
3+β2
7+2β+β2 ,
2+β
7+2β+β2 ,
2+β
7+2β+β2 ) and player 1 accepts. Again, if player 1 proposes,
x∗1,2 = (
3+β2
7+2β+β2 − ,
2+β
7+2β+β2 + ,0) to player 2, the latter will accept since his gains,
β( 2+β7+2β+β2 ), cancel out with his losses. However, player 1
′s losses, β( 2+β7+2β+β2 ) out-
weigh his gains, (1− β)( 2+β7+2β+β2 ), making it impossible for player 1 to propose x
∗
1,2.
Q.E.D.
P 19. Suppose there is only one selfish player, if,
β 6 0.645, (3.5a)
β > 0.645, (3.5b)
provided its the selfish players’ turn to propose, he will make (i) a greedy offer and (ii)
a one-to-one self sacrifice offer, respectively.
10 Look at Appendix C.3, graph 1 and we can see that there is no intersection point.
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Proof: If β 6 0.645, a selfish type will offer, with probability p3,1 = p3,2 = 12 ,
x3,1 = (
2+2β
7−β2 ,0,
5−2β−β2
7−β2 ), x3,2 = (0,
2+2β
7−β2 ,
5−2β−β2
7−β2 ) and player 1 and 2 accept respec-
tively. The selfish type, behaving rationally, will never offer an altruistic player, say
1, x3,1 = (2+2β7−β2 − ,0,
5−2β−β2
7−β + ), since u1(x3,1) < v1, thus, 1 will reject the proposal.
But if 0.645 < β < 1, player 3 will offer with probability p3,1 = p3,2 = 12 ,
x3,1 = (
(2+β)(1+β)
7+2β+β2 ,0,
5−β
7+2β+β2 ) and x3,2 = (0,
(2+β)(1+β)
7+2β+β2 ,
5−β
7+2β+β2 ). When the selfish type
makes the following proposal to player 1, x3,1 = ( (2+β)(1+β)7+2β+β2 − ,0,
5−β
7+2β+β2 + ), since
u1(x3,1) < v1 the altruistic player will reject the proposal. When β > 12 the selfish’s
continuation payoff increases since it becomes cheaper for either one of the Rawl-
sian players to convince its same type. This is what is causing the non-monotonicity
of a selfish players expected utility.11 Due to symmetry we can say the same for
player 2. Q.E.D.
In a bargain free environment, when β < 1 players choose to stay with the entire
dollar for themselves, regardless of their type. However, two salient aspects of this
specific profile of players is that, for high values of β, strategic generosity arises.12.
In other words, high values of β makes it costly to convince a altruistic player, thus
the selfish type will offer a large individual payment to whomever he decides to
convince. 13 Furthermore, since β is high, a Rawlsian will allocate the whole dollar
11 See Appendix C.2, Figure 3, Case 5.
12 See Appendix C.2, Figure 2, Case 2
13 In Appendix C.2, Figure 4, case 5 we see that the function is increasing in β meaning that for
high levels of β the selfish player has to sacrifice a larger share if his individual payment to give it
too any of the other two players if he wants to try and convince the other to accept his proposal.
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amongst all three, in other words, high values of β allows the altruistic proposer to
exploit his awareness towards the least advantaged. This is precisely what explains
the non-monotonicity of the offers at equilibrium for the Rawlsian type.14
Last, irrespective of the value of β, both altruistic players never place an offer
to the selfish type since it will always be the case that the Rawlsian’s maximum
amount he is willing to offer is less than the minimum amount of shares the selfish
player is willing to receive. Hence, an altruist never chooses to bargain with the
selfish player.15. For instance, say it’s player 1 ′s turn to propose and 12 6 β < 0.645.
The minimum amount player 3 ′s is willing to receive is x31 > 5−2β−β
2
7−β2 . Thus, player
1 will deviate and make an offer only to player 3 if 1 − x31 > 3−β
2+2β
7−β2 . But since the
maximum amount player 1 is willing to offer is less than minimum 3 ′s is willing to
receive, the former will not bargain with player 3. We can argue the same for the
two remaining two cases, that is, when β < 12 and 0.645 6 β < 1.
Let us finally consider our last case, that is, when all three players are altruistic.
In particular, this player profile has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure-ish
strategies if,
u1(xi,1) >
1
3
[u1(x2,1) + u1(x3,1) + u1(x1,i)],
for i = {2, 3}.
14In Appendix C.2, Figure 2, Case 2.
15 Refer to Appendix G.
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u2(xi,2) >
1
3
[u2(x1,2) + u2(x3,1) + u2(x2,i)],
for i = {1, 3}.
u3(xi,3 >
1
3
[u3(x1,3) + u3(x2,3) + u3(x3,i)],
for i = {1, 2}.
By symmetry, x21 = x32 = x13 and x31 = x12 = x23. Let, 1 − x
j
i − x
k
i > xji > xki for
i, j,k = {1, 2, 3} for i 6= j 6= k, therefore,
xji >
1− βxki
3− β
and
xki >
1+ xji(β− 3)
β
By solving the system of inequalities: when β < 12 and, say it’s player 1
′s
turn to make a proposal, she chooses to gain support from player 2 and offers,
x1,2 = (
2−β
3−β ,
1
3−β ,0). In the case it’s player 2
′s turn she offers, x2,3 = (0, 2−β3−β ,
1
3−β to
player 3. Last, player 3 will propose, x3,1 = ( 13−β ,0,
2−β
3−β).
Conversely, if β > 12 , whoever it’s turn it is to make a proposal, she chooses to
offer the egalitarian allocation of the dollar, hence x1,2 = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3), x2,3 = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3),
x3,1 = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) and players 2, 3 and 1 accept, respectively.
So, the stationary subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies will be,
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For player 1.
((1,0), (2− β
3− β
, 1
3− β
,0), 1
3
),
if β 6 12 and,
((1,0), ( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), 1
3
),
if 12 < β 6 1.
For player 2.
((1,0), (0, 2− β
3− β
, 1
3− β
), 1
3
),
if β 6 12 and,
((1,0), ( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), 1
3
),
if 12 < β 6 1.
For player 3.
((1,0), ( 1
3− β
,0, 2− β
3− β
), 1
3
),
if β 6 12 and,
((1,0), ( 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), 1
3
),
if 12 < β 6 1.
D 9. An egalitarian proposal from player i is an offer such that, all three
players i, j, and k receive, from i, the same individual payment, that is, xi,j = xi,k =
(1− xi,j − xi,k) = 13 when
1
2 6 β < 1.
D 10. A selfish offer (II) from player i is an offer such that, xi,j = 13−β , xi,k =
0 and (1− xi,j) = 2−β3−β .
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P 20. Suppose all three players are Rawlsian, if the following hold,
β <
1
2
(3.6a)
β >
1
2
(3.6b)
any one of the Rawlsian players make (i) a selfish offer (II) and (ii) an egalitarian
offer, respectively.
Proof: If player 1 proposes, x∗1,2 = ( 2−β3−β − ,
1
3−β , ) for  > 0, player 2 will
accept since his gains, β will cancel out with his losses. However, player 1 ′s
losses, (1− β), exceed his gains, β, hence, u1(x∗1,2) < u1(x1,2), which cannot be; by
symmetry, neither player 2 or 3 will deviate.
Why will the proposer, regardless of whose turn it is to propose, jump to the
egalitarian allocation when β > 12? Say its player 1
′s turn to propose, and she offers
x∗1,2 = (
2−β
3−β − ,
1
3−β , ) as opposed to the egalitarian allocation. Her utility payoff is,
1− (x21 − β) − + β =
2−β
3−β + (2β− 1). Since β >
1
2 and players are not impatient
to close a deal whoever is chosen to reach agreement will reject any offer 13 − 
therefore she’s better off proposing the egalitarian allocation. Q.E.D.
.. C
Why does strategic generosity emerge only for certain player profiles? Is strategic
generosity solely motivated by a players desire, regardless of their utility represen-
tation, to help others? Of course it isn’t the pursuit of other player’s well being and
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happiness what the proposer is trying to achieve, but the satisfaction his own desire
for it.
Even though all types of players who make a proposal under the absence of
negotiations choose the selfish allocation, by considering different arrangements of
players we observe that, strategic generosity arises when each proposer, acting in
her own interest, makes a proposal so that her decision is in accordance with a
willingness to act in consideration of other players. For some composition of types,
it wasn’t obvious what was driving the proposers’ actions to be in consonance with
the interests of another.
We found the following preliminary results. First, when two Rawlsian players
and one selfish player face negotiations, if β < 12 a Rawlsian’s proposal is aligned
with that of a pure selfish player. Surely the proposer gains, if he were to offer sym-
metrical individual payments to the remaining players, isn’t enough to compensate
the costs he would have to pay for making such an offer, that is, (1−β)x21 > βx21 and
(1 − β)x12 > βx12, respectively. Second, as β increases and surpasses the threshold
of 12 both altruistic players become more costly to convince. We can understand
this simply by flipping the previous argument. In which case, a Rawlsian pro-
poser offers symmetrical individual payments to both players which explains the
non-monotonicity present in Figure 3, Case 5. Moreover, for β > 0.645 the selfish
player expected utility increases making it too costly for the other type to make
him an offer. Therefore, provided it’s the selfish types turn to place an offer he can
no longer convince the the other type to accept, either a selfish (I) proposal, or a
greedy proposal. It is by acting in her own interests that he takes into consideration
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other the altruistic’s interests. Strangely enough, the selfish player turns out offer-
ing a greater amount of shares compared to what he stays for herself. In the first
case, Rawlsian players behave seemingly in a selfish way, whereas in the second,
selfish players do seemingly behave selflessly. The first finding explains the non-
monotonicity of Figure 2, Case 2 of Appendix C.2. The last explains the behaviour
of the offers at equilibrium of the selfish type in Figure 3, Case 5 of Appendix C.2.
Our model is a strategic model, and as such it embodies a detailed description of
a special procedure which we have already specified, but of course, such procedure
is only one of possibly many. Furthermore, we know our results may possibly
depend vert strongly on the specification of our bargaining protocol, therefore, in
an effort to overcome these potential weaknesses, a possible solution is to consider
different bargaining protocols, as a first attempt to investigate if the bargaining
procedure we have chosen is responsible of driving agents to behave generously.
This, unfortunately we will leave for further research. While we have preliminary
results for the the three player setup without discounting, further work is still to be
done. For instance, to (i) introduce discounting, (ii) apply other bargaining protocols
to the game in order identify if our results are strongly sensitive to the enforcement
procedures (iii) generalize the model for n players and (iv) characterize the set of
subgame perfect pure-ish Nash equilibrium.
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Appendix A
On Refutability of the Nash
Bargaining Solution
A.. A A: S C  D  P
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate how the piecewise linear preferences that were
constructed in the results of the paper can be transformed into strictly concave C2 functions.
For the sake of simplicity in our presentation, we concentrate on the system of inequalities
obtained in the first section of the paper, but the reader can readily check that the analysis
extends to the rest of the cases considered. Also, since the construction is made individual
by individual, here we simplify our notation by ignoring the super-index that identifies the
agents that are considered in the paper.
That is, suppose that an analyst is given an array of numbers
{(xt, vt,µt, λt) : t = 1, . . . , T }
that satisfies the following system:
µt ′ 6 µt + λt(µt − vt)(xt ′ − xt), (A.1)
with strict inequality if xt ′ 6= xt, µt > vt,and λt > 0.
As in Theorem 2 in Matzkin and Richter (1991), take a strictly convex function h(x) > 0
such that h(x) = 0 only at x = 0, and whose derivative is always less than 1. Given Eq.
(1.30) and the fact that the number of observations is finite, one can construct functions
vt(x) = µt + λt(µt − vt)(x− xt) − th(xt − x),
where t is small enough that
µt ′ 6 µt + λt(µt − vt)(xt ′ − xt) − th(xt − xt ′),
with strict inequality whenever xt 6= xt ′ .
Now, define
u0(x) = min {vt(x) : t = 1, . . . , T } .
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This function is continuous, strictly concave and strictly monotone. By construction, it also
satisfies that u0(xt) = µt and that
u0(x) − vt 6 µt + λt(µt − vt)(x− xt) − vt,
which is the inequality that is critical for the argument that the functions constructed in
Section 1.2.1 rationalize the observed data.
It only remains to to show that the function can be further perturbed to smooth out its
(finitely many) kinks. For this one can use a deformation like the one proposed by Chiappori
and Rochet (1987). By construction, one can fix ε > 0 such that, for all t, u(x) = vt(x)
whenever |x− xt| < ε. Then, define the function ρ : R→ R be defined as
ρ(ψ) =
{
exp
(
− 1
ψ2−1
) [∫
R exp
(
− 1
µ2−1
)
dµ
]−1
, if |ψ| 6 1;
0, otherwise.
Now, consider the following mapping, which takes the convolution of u0 and ρ:
u(x) =
1
ε2
∫
R
u0(x−ψ)ρ
(
ψ

)
dψ.
Chiappori and Rochet show that this function is C∞, strictly concave and strictly increasing,
and rationalizes the same maxima as u0.
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Appendix B
On Inter and Intra-Party Politics
B.. A B: B N E
Using the definitions of the different types of politicians in section 2, we will refer to a pair
(aL,aR) as a Nash equilibrium between militants if
aL ∈ argmaxavL(a) and aR ∈ argmaxavR(a).
The following result is an immediate implication of Weierstrass’s Theorem, given that both
ideology functions are continuous.
P. Suppose that the policy space, A, is compact. Then, a Nash equilibrium between
militants exists.
We say a Nash equilibrium between opportunists is a pair (aL,aR) of policies such that
aL ∈ argmaxapi(a,aR) and aR ∈ argmaxa[1− pi(aL,a)].
The following result casts the prominent result of Duncan (1948) in the language of our
paper. We state it without a proof.
P (The Median Voter Theorem). In this case, the (only) Nash equilibrium between
opportunists is the pair (aL,aR) = (a,a), for a := F−1(1/2).
A Nash equilibrium between pragmatist politicians is a pair (aL,aR) of policies such that
aR ∈ argmaxaµR(aL,a) and aL ∈ argmaxaµL(a,aR).
B.. A: N P.U.N.E  
L 2. There does not exist a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (aL,aR) such that vL(aR) >
vL(aL), or that vR(aL) > vR(aR).
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Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction to our claim, that vL(aR) > vL(aL). Consider first
the case when aL < aR. For a small enough ε > 0, let a = aR − ε. It follows from our
assumptions that
vL(a) > vL(aL),pi(a,aR) > pi(aL,aR) and µL(a,aR) > µL(aL,aR),
where the first inequality follows by continuity of vL, the second one from the fact that
a > aL, and the last one follows from the fact that
lim
ε↑0 µL(aR − ε,aR) = vL(aR) > µL(aL,aR),
given that function µL is continuous. These three inequalities contradict the fact that
(aL,aR) is a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium.
When, on the other hand, aL > aR, if we let a = aR + ε for a small enough ε > 0, it is
true that
vL(a) > vL(aL),pi(a,aR) > pi(aL,aR) and µL(a,aR) > µL(aL,aR),
where the latter inequality follows from the fact that
lim
ε↓0 µL(aR + ε,aR) = vL(aR) > µL(aL,aR).
Again, this is impossible.
The argument for the claim that vR(aL) > vR(aR) cannot occur at equilibrium is similar.
Q.E.D.
B.. A: T     I
Note that one can re-write the expected value function considered by this faction of the left
party, namely Equation (2.1), as
µL(aL,aR) ≡ pi(aL,aR)[vL(aL) − vL(aR)] + vL(aR). (B.1)
By Lemma 2, for party-unanimity Nash equilibria we need only consider (aL,aR) such that
vL(aL) > vL(aR), and, then, for any policy a ∈ A such that
vL(a) > vL(aL) and pi(a,aR) > pi(aL,aR),
one immediately obtains that, in addition,
µL(a,aR) > µL(aL,aR).
A similar argument applies to party R, using Equation (2.2), which allows us to state the
following result.
P 21. A pair of policies (aL,aR) is a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium if, and only
if,
(i) there does not exist a policy a ∈ A such that
vL(a) > vL(aL) and pi(a,aR) > pi(aL,aR),
with at least one of the two inequalities being strict; and
(ii) there does not exist a policy a ∈ A for which
vR(a) > vR(aR) and pi(aL,a) 6 pi(aL,aR),
with at least one strict inequality.
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B.. A: N E, PUNE  N.B.S
Nash Equilibria
For the sake of completeness, here we report the Nash equilibria that the game would
have if each of the parties consisted of only one type of politicians (the same type in both
parties).
The only Nash equilibrium between Militants is straightforward: in each party, it is a
strictly dominant strategy to play its most extreme policy, so the possible Nash equilibrium
is the policy pair (aL,aR) = (0, 1).
Although the support function pi that we are now using is not founded by an underlying
distribution of voters’ preferences, an analogous to the Median Voter Theorem nonetheless
holds. To see that this is the case, note first that there can be no Nash equilibrium between
opportunists’ where the two parties play different policies. If this were the case, namely
is aL 6= aR, one of the two parties (at least) would be making suboptimal decisions: if
pi(aL,aR) = 1, then party R would prefer, for instance to play policy a = aL; if pi(aL,aR) = 0,
analogously, party L would prefer a = aR; if 0 < pi(aL,aR) < 1, since b > 0, both parties
would prefer to play policies that are closer to the one of the opposing party.
It follows that in order to find Nash equilibria between opportunists we only need to
consider policy pairs of the type (aL,aR) = (a˜, a˜). Now, notice that if 2ba˜ − C < 1/2, we
have that each party would be better off by deviating to a different policy: for instance, if
aR = a, then, if party L deviates to a = a˜+ ε, for small enough ε > 0,
pi(a,aR) = 1− 2ba˜− bε+ C >
1
2
= pi(aL,aR).
A similar argument allows the dismissal of pairs (aL,aR) = (a˜, a˜) such that 2ba˜− C > 1/2,
so the only possible equilibrium is at
(aL,aR) =
(
1+ 2C
4b
, 1+ 2C
4b
)
.
Now, that this is, indeed, a Nash equilibrium between opportunists is straightforward again:
function pi(a, a˜), which is continuous as a function of a, attains its global maximum at
a = a˜.
The only Nash equilibrium between pragmatists is the policy pair
(aL,aR) =
(
C
2b
, 1+ C
2b
)
.
For the sake of presentation, we argue this statement as proof of the following proposition.
P 22. In the simplified version of the game we are now considering, the only Nash
equilibrium between Militants is the policy pair (aL,aR) = (0, 1), the only equilibrium between
opportunists is
(aL,aR) =
(
1+ 2C
4b
, 1+ 2C
4b
)
,
and the only equilibrium between pragmatists is
(aL,aR) =
(
C
2b
, 1+ C
2b
)
.
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Proof: It only remains to prove the third statement. Note first that there can be no
equilibrium (aL,aR) where pi(aL,aR) > 0 and aL > aR, for, in such case, if the left played
a = aR
µL(a,aR) = 1− aR > pi(aL,aR)(1− aL) + [1− pi(aL,aR)](1− aR) = µL(aL,aR).
We can similarly rule out (aL,aR) where pi(aL,aR) < 1 and aL > aR, using an argument for
the Right party.
Next, consider the case when (aL,aR) = (a˜, a˜). Suppose first that a˜ > C/2b. Then, by
using a = a˜− ε, for ε > 0 small enough, the Left party would have pi(a,aR) > 0 and
µL(a,aR) = pi(a, a˜)(1− a) + [1− pi(a, a˜)](1− a˜) > 1− a˜ = pi(aL,aR).
If, on the other hand, a˜ 6 C/2b, then, playing a = a˜+ ε, for ε > 0 small enough, the Right
party would have
µR(aL,a) = pi(a˜,a)a˜+ [1− pi(a˜,a)]a > a˜ = pi(aL,aR).
Now, consider the case in which aL < aR and pi(aL,aR) = 0. Suppose first that aR >
C/2b. In this case, for any
c
b
− aR < a < aR,
we would have that pi(a,aR) > 0, and, hence, that
µL(a,aR) = pi(a,aR)(1− a) + [1− pi(a,aR)](1− aR) > 1− aR = µL(aL,aR),
so the Left party would not be best-responding. On the other hand, note that if aR 6 C/2b,
then aL < C/2b and then, letting a = C/b − aL we would have that a > aR > aL and
pi(aL,a) = 0, so that
µR(aL,a) = a > aR = µR(aL,aR),
so the Right party would not be best-responding.
As before, a similar argument allows us to rule out the possibility that aL < aR and
pi(aL,aR) = 1 at equilibrium.
The only policy profiles that can be Nash equilibrium between pragmatists, then, must
have 0 < pi(aL,aR) < 1 and aL 6 aR. With 0 < pi(a,aR) < 1 and considering a < aR only,
we can write
µL(a,aR) = [b(a+ aR) − C](aR − a) + (1− aR),
which is maximized at aL = C/2b. Similarly, if 0 < pi(aL,a) < 1 and considering a > aL
only,
µR(aL,a) = [b(aL + a) − C](aL − a) + a,
which is maximized at aR = (1 + C)/2b. It follows that the only potential candidate for
Nash equilibrium is the pair
(aL,aR) =
(
C
2b
, 1+ C
2b
)
.
That these two policies constitute a pair of mutual local best responses is immediate
from their definitions. To see that these are actually global best responses, note first that if
pi(a,aR) = 0, or when a = aR, then
µL(a,aR) =
2b− 1− C
2b
<
1
2
= µL(aL,aR),
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where the inequality holds because, by assumption, C > 2b−2 > b−1. Obviously, if a > aR,
then µL(a,aR) < 1/2 = µL(aL,aR). For the Right, note that if pi(aL,a) = 1, or when a = aL,
then
µR(aL,a) =
C
2b
<
1
2
= µR(aL,aR),
where the inequality comes from the fact that, by assumption, C < 2b− 1 and C < 1, which
suffices to imply that C < b. Again, if a < aL, then µR(aL,a) < 1/2 = µR(aL,aR). Q.E.D.
Figure B.1 illustrates the positions of the three basic equilibria in the space of policy
pairs. A particular feature of the functional forms we have chosen is that in both Nash
equilibria played between opportunists and between pragmatists the two parties obtain one
half of the popular support:
pi
(
1+ 2C
4b
, 1+ 2C
4b
)
= b
(
1+ 2C
4b
+
1+ 2C
4b
)
− C =
1
2
,
while
pi
(
C
2b
, 1+ C
2b
)
= b
(
C
2b
+
1+ C
2b
)
− C =
1
2
.
The same need not be true in the Nash equilibrium between militants, as pi(0, 1) = b− C.
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Figure B.1: The basic Nash equilibria of the simple game.
Party-unanimity Nash equilibria
We now compute the set of all Roemer equilibria for the simplified version of the
game. Some previous results allow us to simplify this task: by Lemma 2 (See Appendix
B.2), we know that we only need to consider policy pairs (aL,aR) where aL 6 aR; by
Proposition 21, given a policy pair (aL,aR) we only need to check that for no a it is
true that vL(a) > vL(aL) and pi(a,aR) > pi(aL,aR), with at least one strict inequality, nor
vR(a) > vR(aR) and pi(aL,a) 6 pi(aL,aR), with one strict inequality at least.
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L 3. The only party-unanimity Nash equilibrium at which pi(aL,aR) = 0 is
(aL,aR) =
(
0, C
b
)
.
Proof: We first argue that (aL,aR) = (0,C/b) is indeed an equilibrium. As 0 is the only
solution to program
max
a∈A
vL(a),
it follows that there can be no a 6= 0 for which vL(a) > vL(aL). As for the Right, any
a < C/b would imply vR(a) < vR(aR), while for any a > C/b one would have
pi(aL,a) = pi(0,a) = ba− C > b
C
b
− C = 0 = pi(aL,aR).
Now, consider any pair (aL,aR) 6= (0,C/b) such that pi(aL,aR) = 0. If aL > 0, letting
a = 0 we get vL(a) > vL(aL) and pi(a,aR) > pi(aL,aR), so if this policy pair is going to be
an equilibrium it must be that aL = 0. If aR < C/b, then, by playing a = C/b the Right
would have vR(a) > vR(aR) and pi(aL,a) = 0 6 pi(aL,aR). Alternatively, it must be true that
aR > C/b, but this is impossible, since in such case
pi(aL,aR) = pi(0,aR) = baR − C > b
C
b
− C = 0,
which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
A similar argument, mutatis mutandis, gives us the following result.
L 4. The only party-unanimity Nash equilibrium at which pi(aL,aR) = 1 is
(aL,aR) =
(
1+ C− b
b
, 1
)
.
Proof: In the same vein we argue that
( 1+C−b
b , 1
)
is an equilibrium. Since 1 is the only
solution to program
max
a∈A
vR(a)
there can be no a 6= 1 for which vR(a) > vR(aR). In the case of party L, any a > 1+C−bb
would imply that vL(a) < vL(aL), and for a < 1+C−bb we have,
pi(a,aR) = pi(a, 1) = b(1+ a) − C < 1 = pi(aL,aR)
Now, let us consider any pair (aL,aR) 6= ( 1+C+bb , 1) such that pi(aL,aR) = 1. If aR < 1,
letting a = 1, we get that vR(a) > vR(aR) and pi(aL,a) 6 pi(aL,aR), so, if the policy pair is an
equilibrium, it must be that aR = 1. If aL > 1+C−bb , then by L playing a =
1+C−b
b , the party
would get vL(a) > vL(aL) and pi(a,aR) > pi(aL,aR). So, it must be true that aL < 1+C−bb , but,
pi(aL,aR) = pi(aL, 1) = b(aL + 1) − C < b
(
1+ 1+ C+ b
b
)
− C = 1
which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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L 5. The only party-unanimity Nash equilibrium at which aL = aR is
(aL,aR) =
(
1+ 2C
4b
, 1+ 2C
4b
)
.
Proof: Note first that (aL,aR) = (0,0) cannot be an equilibrium: for ε > 0 small enough,
since C > 0, letting a = ε the Right
pi(aL,a) = max{0,bε− C} = 0 <
1
2
= pi(aL,aR),
while vR(a) > vR(aR). A similar argument allows us to rule out the possibility that (aL,aR) =
(1, 1) be an equilibrium.
Now, fix any 0 < a < 1 and consider the profile (aL,aR) = (a,a). If lima↑a pi(a,a) > 1/2,
then, by playing a = a − ε, for ε > 0 small enough, the Left would have that pi(a,aR) >
1/2 = pi(aL,aR) while vL(a) > vL(aL), so the pair cannot be an equilibrium. Alternatively,
if lima↑a pi(a,a) < 1/2, we must have, by construction, that lima↓a pi(a,a) < 1/2, in which
case, by playing a = a + ε, for ε > 0 small enough, the Right would have that pi(aL,a) <
1/2 = pi(aL,aR) while vR(a) > vR(aR).
The only case left is when lima→a pi(a, a˜) = 1/2. The only point at which this occurs is
a˜ =
1+ 2C
4b
.
As in the case of the Nash equilibrium between Opportunists, if we observe that, as a
function of a, pi(a, a˜) attains its maximum precisely at a˜, we conclude that (aL,aR) = (a˜, a˜)
is a Roemer equilibrium: any other a would cause pi(a,aR) < 1/2 = pi(aL,aR) and pi(aL,a) >
1/2 = pi(aL,aR). Q.E.D.
These three lemmas have considered «corner» policy pairs. We can rule out pairs
with aL > aR as equilibria, either by appealing to the general claim made in Lemma
2 (see Appendix C), or by the following straightforward observations: if aL > aR and
pi(aL,aR) 6 1/2, then by playing a = aR, the Left would get vL(a) > vL(aL) and pi(a,aR) =
1/2 > pi(aL,aR); if, alternatively, aL > aR and pi(aL,aR) > 1/2, then, by playing a = aL, the
Right would get vR(a) > vR(aR) and pi(aL,a) = 1/2 < pi(aL,aR).
The following lemma completes the analysis.
L 6. Any policy pair (aL,aR) such that aL < aR and 0 < pi(aL,aR) < 1 is a party-
unanimity Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider any such policy pair (aL,aR), and take any a ∈ A. If a < aL, then
pi(a,aR) < pi(aL,aR), while if a > aL, vL(a) < vL(aL). Similarly, a > aR, then pi(aL,a) >
pi(aL,aR), while if a < aR, vR(a) < vR(aR). Q.E.D.
For the sake of clarity in our presentation, we summarize these results in the following
proposition, and illustrate the set of Roemer equilibria in Figure B.2.
P 23. In the simplified version of the game we are now considering, the only
party-unanimity Nash equilibria are the policy pairs(
0, C
b
)
,
(
1+ C− b
b
, 1
)
and
(
1+ 2C
4b
, 1+ 2C
4b
)
,
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as well as any policy pair (aL,aR) such that
aL < aR and 0 < pi(aL,aR) < 1.
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Figure B.2: The set of party-unanimity Nash equilibria of the simple game is the shaded
area. It only includes its boundaries where these are drawn in a continuous line, and it
contains, in particular, the three dots.
It is immediate, either from comparison of Propositions 22 and 23 or from comparison
of Figures B.1 and B.2, that each of the simple Nash equilibria of the game is also a Roemer
equilibrium.
Nash bargaining solutions
Using the observation of §2.3.3, we replace Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4) by the following definition:
we say that a policy pair (aL,aR) is a Nash bargaining solution if there exist nonnegative
numbers αL, βL, αR, βR such that αL + βL 6 1 and αR + βR 6 1, for which policy aL solves
program
max
a
[pi(a,aR)1−βL(aR − aL)1−αL ],
while policy aR solves program
max
a
{[1− pi(aL,a)]1−βR(aR − aL)1−αR}.
Focusing on policy pairs that satisfy aL 6 aR, we can rewrite these programs by requiring
that aL solve
max
a
[pi(a,aR)ρL(aR − aL)], (B.2)
and that aR solve
max
a
{[1− pi(aL,a)]ρR(aR − aL)}, (B.3)
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where
ρL :=
1− βL
1− αL
and ρR :=
1− βR
1− αR
.
In this simpler notation, the values of ρi that we can allow are any number in R+, as well
as ∞. If ρi = 0, the militants of party i have no say in the negotiations of their party.
When it is the opportunists that have no bargaining power, we use ρi = ∞ to denote that
the party’s program is, respectively,
max
a
pi(a,aR) or max
a
[1− pi(aL,a)]. (B.4)
Interior equilibria
Consider first the case in which 0 < ρi < ∞ for both parties. We want to find all the
equilibria for which aL < aR and 0 < pi(aL,aR) < 1, to which we refer as «interior».
Ignore, for a moment, the constraints that aL > 0 and aR 6 1, which we shall impose
momentarily. If ρL > 1, the best-response function defined by Program (B.2) is, by direct
computation,
aL(aR) =
C
b(ρL + 1)
+
ρL − 1
ρL + 1
aR, (B.5)
for all 0 < aR 6 1. When ρL < 1, the constraint that aL < aR may bind, and the best-response
function is
aL(aR) =
{
0, if aR < Cb(1−ρL) ;
C
b(ρL+1) +
ρL−1
ρL+1aR, otherwise.
(B.6)
Similarly, the best-response function defined by Program (B.3), when ρR > 1 is
aR(aL) =
1+ C
b(ρR + 1)
+
ρR − 1
ρR + 1
aL,
for all 0 6 aL < 1. Or, if ρR < 1, it is
aR(aL) =
{
1, if aL > 1+C−b(ρR+1)b(1−ρR) ;
1+C
b(ρR+1) +
ρR−1
ρR+1aL, otherwise.
Consider first the case where ρL > 1 and ρR > 1. Using the two best-response functions
given above, we find that their intersection occurs when
aL =
C
2b
+
ρL − 1
2b(ρL + ρR)
and aR =
1+ C
2b
+
1− ρR
2b(ρL + ρR)
. (B.7)
Now, for this policy pair to be a bona fide equilibrium, it must satisfy the constraints that
aL > 0 and aR 6 1. By direct computation, these constraints are satisfied if the following
condition holds:
ρR > max
{
1
C
− ρL
1+ C
C
, 1
2b− C
+ ρL
(
1
2b− C
− 1
)}
. (B.8)
Figure B.3 illustrates the values of (ρL, ρR) for which Condition (B.8) is satisfied. It also
defines some areas and points in the space of (ρL, ρR) that will be useful to express all the
equilibria of the game.
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Figure B.3: Condition B.8 holds at any point in the area above both downward-sloping
lines (that is, at the union of areas I, X, Z, W and Y).
It is immediate from Eq. (B.7) that these interior Nash bargaining solutions amount to
perturbations
1
2b
(∆L,∆R)
to the Nash equilibrium between pragmatists, these perturbations being of the form
∆L =
ρL − 1
ρL + ρR
and ∆R =
1− ρR
ρL + ρR
.
In order to recover the set of all these solutions, we can then study the set of pairs (∆L,∆R)
that are induced by (ρL, ρR) in the union of areas I, Z and W in Figure B.3 – namely,
pairs (ρL, ρR) that satisfy Condition (B.8). This space of (∆L,∆R) is illustrated in Figure B.4,
where we also associate regions of the space with the areas of (ρL, ρR) that induce them.
In order to find the set of interior Nash bargaining solutions, now we simply need to
add these perturbations (rescaled by 1/2b) to the policy pair
(aL,aR) =
(
C
2b
, 1+ C
2b
)
.
This is done in Figure B.5.
By direct computation, if we consider pairs (ρL, ρR) that violate Condition B.8, then the
constraints that aL > 0 and aR 6 1 bind, and the associated Nash bargaining solutions lie in
the boundary of the space of interior solutions constructed before. These cases correspond
to the areas marked M, N and O in Figure B.3, and the set of solutions generated by them
is illustrated in Figure B.5, by marking the areas they induce.
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Figure B.4: The space of perturbations (∆L,∆R) induced by (ρL, ρR) in the union of areas
I, Z and W in Figure B.3 is the shaded area. The labels indicate the area of Figure B.3
that induces each region.
Importantly, comparison of Figures B.2 and B.5 shows that all the interior Nash bar-
gaining solutions are party-unanimity Nash equilibria, which verifies the observations of
§2.3.2.
Corner solutions
We now compute the Nash bargaining solutions for the cases when some ρi is 0 or ∞, as
well as for the case where aL = aR at the solution. We refer to these cases as «corner»
solutions. We treat all these cases independently.
Case 1: If ρL = ρR = 0. In this case, the Nash bargaining solution corresponds to the
unique Nash equilibrium between militants, namely (aL,aR) = (0, 1).
Case 2: If ρL = 0 and ρR ∈ R++. In this case, the only solution to Program (B.2) is
aL = 0. On the other hand, given aL = 0, the solution to Program (B.3) is
aR =
{
min
{
1+C
b(ρR+1) , 1
}
, if ρ < 1C ;
C
b , otherwise.
The second condition in the expression above corresponds to point x and area X in Figure
B.3; all these points generate the policy pair (aL,aR) = (0,C/b) as Nash bargaining solution.
The first condition in the expression generates the set {0}×(C/b, 1] of policy pairs. Of course,
the case ρL ∈ R++ and ρR = 0 is analogous, and generates the set[
0, 1+ C− b
b
]
× {1}
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Figure B.5: The set of interior Nash bargaining solutions of the simple game is the
shaded area. It only includes its boundaries where these are drawn in a continuous line; it
does not contain the two dots. The labels indicate the area of Figure B.3 that induces each
region.
of policy pairs as Nash bargaining solutions.1
Case 3: If ρL =∞ and ρR =∞. In this case, the only Nash bargaining solution is the
Nash equilibrium between opportunists,
(aL,aR) =
(
1+ 2C
4b
, 1+ 2C
4b
)
.
It follows also by construction that this policy pair is the only solution with aL = aR.
As in the case of interior solutions, the Nash bargaining solutions generated by pairs
(ρL, ρR) are all Roemer equilibria. If we add these solutions to the set of interior solutions
obtained before, we enrich Figure B.5 as in Figure B.6. Importantly, all these solutions are,
at the same time, party unanimity Nash equilibria. The same property will not hold for the
two remaining cases, which we consider next.
Case 4: If ρL = 0 and ρR =∞. In this case, for the Left the only solution to Program
(B.2) is to play policy aL = 0, whatever the Right does. Given this, the set of solutions to
Program (B.4) for the Right is any aR ∈ (0, c/b], so that the set {0}× (0, c/b] of policy pairs
1 Note that the correspondence defined by the Nash bargaining solution as one varies the value
of (ρL, ρR) is not upper hemi-continuous: the sequence of policy pairs generated by a sequence of
pairs (ρL, ρR) that converges to a point in area X of Figure B.3 would converge to some point in the
downward-sloping dashed line that starts at point (0,C/b) in Figure B.5; any point in area X, on
the other hand, would generate (0,C/b).
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Figure B.6: The set of corner Nash bargaining solutions of the simple game, corresponding
to cases 1-3, adds the three dots to the shaded area. The boundaries at aL = 0 and aR = 1
are generated by further values of (ρL, ρR) (that is, in addition to those that gave these
boundaries as interior solutions).
also constitutes Nash bargaining solutions for the game. Similarly, the case when ρL = ∞
and ρR = 0 generates the set [
1
1+ C− 2b
, 1
)
× {1}
of policy pairs as Nash bargaining solutions. These sets, as well as those solutions generated
by the next case, are illustrated in Figure B.8.
Case 5: If ρL ∈ R++ and ρR = ∞. In this case, the Right is represented only by
opportunists, and the relevant maximization program is given by Eq. (B.4). By direct
computation, the correspondence defined by the solution to that program is
aR(aL) =

[
aL, Cb − aL,
)
, if aL 6 C2b ;
∅, if C2b < aL > 1+2C4b ;{ 1+2C
4b
}
, if aL = 1+2C4b ;
∅, if 1+2C4b < aL < 1+C2b ;[ 1+C
b − aL,aL
)
, if aL > 1+C2b .
(B.9)
For the Left, the relevant program is given by Eq. (B.2), and its maximizer by Eqs. (B.5) or
(B.6), depending on the value of ρL. These correspondences are depicted in Figure B.7. It is
immediate from the Figure that the set
{(aL,aR) : 0 6 aL < aR 6
C
2b
}
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of policy pairs is the set of Nash bargaining solutions generated by this case. The analogous
case when ρL =∞ and ρR ∈ R++ generates the set
{(aL,aR) :
1+ C
2b
6 aL < aR 6 1}
as Nash bargaining solutions.
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Figure B.7: The maximizer correspondences (B.9) and (B.5) or (B.6). The intersection of
the two graphs gives the Nash bargaining solutions corresponding to Case 5.
Figure B.8 depicts the Nash bargaining solutions generated by Cases 4 and 5. Impor-
tantly, most of these policy pairs are not Roemer equilibrium. For case 4, one could refine
the Nash bargaining solutions, by requiring that each party’s policy satisfy the «efficiency»
conditions of Proposition 23, in which case the only surviving policy pairs would be(
0, C
b
)
and
(
1+ C− b
b
, 1
)
,
which are, indeed, Roemer equilibria. But in Case 5, it follows that the same refinement
would fail to generate a solution, for the refinements of correspondences (B.9) and (B.5) or
(B.6) would not intersect.
We summarize all these findings in the following proposition.
P 24. In the simplified version of the game we are now considering,
1. the set of all the Roemer equilibria is the set of Nash bargaining solutions generated by
finite ρL and ρR;
2. when ρi =∞ for one of the parties, the induced Nash bargaining solutions need not be
Roemer equilibria;
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Figure B.8: The set of corner Nash bargaining solutions of the simple game corresponding
to cases 4 and 5 adds the shaded area.
3. in any case, aL < aR holds at all Nash bargaining solutions, with the exception of policy
pair (
1+ 2C
4b
, 1+ 2C
4b
)
.
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Appendix C
A bargaining model with Strategic
Generosity
C.. A: P, M  O
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C.. A: O  
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C.. A: M       , 
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Figure C.1: Maximum willingness to pay and Minimum willingness to receive
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